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1 General Introduction
Categories help us organize the world. They help us predict and hypothesize about category members
and aid us in selecting the most appropriate response for each situation. Language plays a key role in
categorization and category learning. It provides structure in the form of category labels. It affects how we
think about and even perceive categories. As Lupyan (2012) puts it, language augments our thought. Thus,
any thorough investigation of how we learn categories must consider the role of language. Many theoretical
frameworks do just this, often by separating categorization which involves language from that which does
not. For example, COVIS, a key theory in perceptual category learning, emphasizes the competition be-
tween verbal and implicit systems for categorization (Ashby et al., 1998). Another theory explicitly separates
category learning into verbal and nonverbal (Minda & Miles, 2010). However, this approach results in an all-
or-none viewpoint of language’s effect on category learning; language either influences category learning
or it does not. In this process, the question of how language affects category learning is left unanswered.
Thus, the current work seeks to both define a theory of category learning and explore the role language
has in this theory. In this review I will synthesize multiple approaches to category learning. Following the
synthesis, I will review relevant literature that provides suggestions as to how language might be involved
in category learning. Through these efforts, I will provide a theoretical framework and hypotheses for this
dissertation.
1.1 Dual-systems model for category learning
Multiple theories converge on the idea that there are two systems for category learning. In this section, I
will first describe a generalized dual-systems model that pulls threads from all of these theories and then
go on to describe how each theory fits into the overarching framework.
1.1.1 Proposed model
The proposed model involves two systems for category learning. The first, which I title the associative
system, uses associative mechanisms in an iterative manner to learn distributions of features. This system
is best suited for learning multidimensional similarity-based categories such as natural kinds. It is difficult to
describe necessary and sufficient rules for inclusion for these categories. Similarity-based categories have
features that are correlated and probabilistic, such that a given category instance may not have all of the
category-relevant features but does tend to have some distribution of them. For example, although Manx
cats do not have tails, a typical feature of cats, they are still undeniably members of the category cat. Thus,
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the associative system must be able to extract the most frequent pattern of features over many instances in
order to learn a category.
In contrast, the hypothesis-testing system uses a more explicit learning method to test and adjust
hypotheses about category boundaries. This method relies on selection of relevant features rather than
representation of a distribution of feature probabilities. As such, it is most suited for learning rule-based
categories, which typically have one or a few easily verbalizable rules for inclusion. For example, the ad
hoc category things to be sold at the garage sale has a simple rule for inclusion that perfectly separates
members from non-members. If it will be sold at the garage sale, it is in the category, otherwise it is not.
Thus, we have two systems for category learning, each one ideal for learning a different type of category.
In the upcoming sections, I will describe theoretical and empirical evidence for a dual-systems model from
five different approaches to category learning. I will show how each approach informs the current theoretical
framework. I have provided Table 1 to consolidate the different terminology from each approach into the
two systems discussed here.
Table 1
Terminology for the associative and hypothesis-testing systems in each approach.
Approach Associative Hypothesis-testing
COVIS Information-integration Rule-basedImplicit Verbal
Dimensionality High-dimensional Low-dimensional
Statistical Density Dense SparseCompression-based Selection-based
Verbal/nonverbal Nonverbal Verbal
Taxonomic/thematic Taxonomic Thematic
1.1.2 COVIS
COVIS stands for COmpetition between Verbal and Implicit Systems. First proposed by Ashby et al. in
1998, it is a prominent theoretical framework for perceptual category learning. This framework provides
a dual-systems model that is grounded in neuropsychological data, allowing it to suggest neurobiological
underpinnings for the two systems. It is important to note that this framework is mostly concerned with
perceptual categories, which are defined as ”a collection of similar objects belonging to the same group”
(Ashby & Maddox, 2005, p. 151). This is in contrast to concepts, which Ashby and colleagues define as
groups of related ideas. Thus, this approach focuses on categorizing objects that can be encountered and
perceived in the real world.
As can be inferred from the title, the two category learning systems in COVIS are the verbal and implicit
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systems. The verbal system is COVIS’ answer to our hypothesis-testing system. It is a declarative learning
system that uses a hypothesis-testing method to learn category rules, typically for rule-based stimuli. Under
COVIS, rule-based stimuli must have inclusion rules that are easy to describe verbally. Typically, rule-based
stimuli used by Ashby and colleagues have a single rule for inclusion or two rules combined by a logical
operator (e.g., AND, OR) When a rule-based category involves multiple dimensions, decisions about each
dimension are made separately, and these decisions are used to evaluate the logical operators. In other
words, each dimension is considered on its own before their combination. These guidelines for rule-based
categories ensure that an explicit hypothesis-testing method can be used to learn them. When learning a
new category, the verbal system holds potential category inclusion rules in working memory that are then
tested as stimuli are encountered. Over time, hypotheses are tested and switched until they reflect the
optimal strategy for categorization. Individual differences in rule-based category learning have been shown
to be related to an individual’s cognitive flexibility (Reetzke et al., 2016), suggesting that the verbal system
relies at least partially on executive function.
The implicit system from COVIS is most similar to our associative system. Like the associative sys-
tem, it uses incremental learning to find category boundaries. It is most ideal for learning information-
integration categories, which are like similarity-based categories but have also some specific guidelines.
Information-integration categories are defined by some combination of dimensions. However, while each
dimension can be considered separately in rule-based categories, all dimensions must be considered si-
multaneously for information-integration categories. Information-integration category membership depends
on both the values associated with each dimension as well as the relationship between these values.
Information-integration category boundaries are difficult or impossible to describe verbally, and the struc-
ture of information-integration categories requires an iterative, associative learning method. COVIS sug-
gests that the implicit system relies on an information stream that connects stimuli, motor responses, and
feedback to learn category membership.
One of the most substantial contributions of COVIS is its strong grounding in neurobiology. In the original
paper, Ashby and colleagues proposed specific brain regions involved the verbal and implicit (associative)
systems, supported by neuroimaging and patient studies. The verbal system relies on the prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), striatum, hippocampus, and the head of the caudate nucleus.
Information about the stimuli are processed in fronto-striatial loops, where potential category rules are gen-
erated. The PFC keeps these rules in working memory while the ACC and the head of the caudate nucleus
mediate switching between rules based on feedback. Finally, the hippocampus stores longer-term mem-
ory of which rules have already been tested. The hippocampus is only involved when the task is complex
enough that previously tested rules cannot all be stored in working memory (Ashby & Maddox, 2005, 2011).
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Patient data shows that individuals with frontal damage as well as individuals with Parkison’s disease,
which affects the basal ganglia including the caudate nucleus, show difficulty in rule-based tasks such as
the Wisconsin Cart Sorting Test (Robinson et al., 1980) and an experimental rule-based category learning
task (Ashby et al., 2003). This suggests that both frontal regions and the basal ganglia are involved in
rule-based categorization. More recent neuroimaging work, however, is still mixed as to the involvement of
different areas specifically for rule-based categorization. Soto et al. (2013) found that two separate rule-
based tasks could be differentiated based on activation in ventro-lateral PFC, suggesting that specific rules
are stored in that region. Nomura et al. (2007) found activation specific to rule-based categorization in the
medial temporal lobe (MTL), which contains the hippocampus. However, a later study failed to find any
activation that was specifically greater for rule-based categorization (Carpenter et al., 2016). Thus, the
neural underpinnings of the verbal system are still under debate.
The implicit system from COVIS has a different neurobiological pathway for category learning. It uses
incremental learning rather than hypothesis testing to learn information-integration categories. The main
structure involved in this procedural learning system is the striatum, which is involved in reinforcement
learning, with dopamine as the reinforcement signal. From the striatum, information about the category is
sent to the thalamus and the globus pallidus, which is within the basal ganglia. From there, information runs
to motor and premotor cortex. This system links stimuli with motor responses during categorization as well
as feedback to allow the participant to learn categories. Neuroimaging studies using the implicit system
again are mixed, with some finding activation in the caudate body while others fail to find that activation,
instead seeing activity in parahippocampal regions (Carpenter et al., 2016; Nomura et al., 2007). A separate
study also found a role for the putamen in similarity-based category learning (Waldschmidt & Ashby, 2011).
As with the verbal system, the neural basis of the implicit system requires more study.
COVIS provides us with a few key insights. First, it is one of the most studied dual-systems theories of
categorization. While Ashby and colleagues generally use visual stimuli for their tasks, this paradigm has
been extended to other perceptual domains such as hearing/speech (Chandrasekaran et al., 2014, 2016).
As such, there are many COVIS studies to compare the current framework with. It also makes clear claims
about the neurobiological basis of the two systems of category learning. While the specifics of these claims
are still under debate in the literature, they at least provide regions of interest for researchers who want to
conduct neuroimaging research on a dual-systems model of category learning. Finally, this approach is one
of the only ones to consider how the two systems interact, a topic which will be discussed further below.
4
1.1.3 Dimensionality
The dimensionality approach, led by Lupyan and colleagues, considers categories in terms of the dimen-
sions on which they cohere. Low-dimensional categories are the same on one or a small number of dimen-
sions (e.g., color) and allow other dimensions to vary. Low-dimensional categories are similar to rule-based
categories, as they can be described using relatively simple rules (e.g., things that are red). In fact, some
of Lupyan’s papers define low-dimensional categories as those that have a single dimension that can dis-
tinguish category members from non-members (Lupyan & Mirman, 2013). Examples of low-dimensional
categories from this study include things made of wood and things with handles.
In contrast, high-dimensional categories are those that cohere on multiple dimensions, often so many
that category rules are difficult to describe. Examples of high-dimensional categories from the previously-
mentioned study include birds, tools, things that fly, and objects that hold water. Most natural kinds and
artifacts are high-dimensional, as well as some ad hoc categories. Like similarity-based categories, high-
dimensional categories require their members to be the same on most (but not all) relevant dimensions.
The core prediction tested using this approach is that low-dimensional categorization relies more heavily
on language than high-dimensional categorization. The dimensionality approach postulates that language
helps an individual select features, which is a process only helpful for low-dimensional categorization. High-
dimensional categorization relies on creating associations across multiple features, which does not require
language.
To explore this prediction, Lupyan and colleagues have interfered with language ability in multiple ways
across studies. In each study, they found that a reduction in language ability was associated with poorer
performance on low- but not high-dimensional categorization. Lupyan & Mirman (2013) measured catego-
rization ability in individuals with aphasia for both low- and high-dimensional categories. They found that the
individuals with aphasia performed similarly to unimpaired controls on the high-dimensional categories, but
showed significantly lower accuracy on the low-dimensional categories. Lupyan (2009) used a concurrent
verbal load to reduce the verbal resources available during a categorization task. He found that individuals
showed significantly poorer categorization with a verbal load as compared to a visuospatial load specifi-
cally for category judgments based on a single dimension but not for those based on multiple dimensions.
Other studies manipulated language ability by using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Reduc-
ing excitability in a language-critical region (left inferior frontal gyrus) has been shown to lead to poorer
performance on low-dimensional but not high-dimensional categorization (Lupyan et al., 2012). Addition-
ally, reducing excitability over Wernicke’s area makes participants more likely to choose a bi-dimensional
strategy for stimuli that can either be categorized using a uni-dimenional or a bi-dimensional strategy. This
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indicates that interfering with language functioning results in participants using higher-dimensional catego-
rization strategies (Perry & Lupyan, 2014).
Researchers using the dimensionality approach have provided evidence for the role of language in low-
dimensional categorization using multiple experimental methods. Unlike COVIS, where the verbal system
largely uses language to describe and rehearse candidate category rules, the dimensionality approach
suggests that language is used to select relevant features for a category. This idea has highly influenced
the current study’s dual-systems model, in which the hypothesis-testing system selects category-relevant
features. However, the evidence for this approach is largely unable to speak for the system underlying high-
dimensional categorization, as most of the results for this system are null effects. Thus, it is not clear from
this approach whether the hypothesized broad inter-item association building is in fact how individuals learn
high-dimensional categories. In addition, while the authors claim that poorer low-dimensional categorization
performance reflects difficulty in selecting category-relevant dimensions, the studies mentioned above do
not directly test how interfering with language ability affects selection or inhibition ability.
1.1.4 Statistical density
The statistical density framework focuses on the structure of categories, which is defined by the relation-
ships among members and non-members. Pioneered by Sloutsky, it proposes two category learning sys-
tems that are each used to extract different types of regularities from a stream of information, allowing for
flexibility in the data collected (Sloutsky, 2010). Sloutsky’s main metric for describing categories is called
statistical density. In this section, I will describe statistical density in a broad sense; for more detailed
information on how to calculate it, see Appendix A (p. 69).
The statistical density of a category is related to the ratio between the amount of entropy within a target
category and the entropy between the target category and other categories in the set. In this context,
entropy refers to variation within features. As an example, consider a set of geometric objects. These
shapes can vary in shape, size, and color. The within-category entropy for squares in this set is all of
the different sizes and colors that the squares come in. The between-category entropy includes all of the
variation in size, color, and shape for the items in the set. Sparse categories have lots of within-category
entropy; the items in the category cohere on only one or a few dimensions. All other dimensions are allowed
to vary freely. In our geometric objects example, a sparse square category would have squares of all color
and sizes, such that color and size was not related to shape. Thus, to find the category square, an individual
would have to isolate the shape feature.
In contrast, dense categories have little within-category entropy; their members have multiple intercor-
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related features that together are predictive of category membership. There are few irrelevant features in
dense categories. Within our set of geometric objects, the square category would be considered dense if
all squares shared the same color and size. The distribution of these other features are what determine the
statistical density of a category. If irrelevant features (here, color and size) are correlated with the relevant
feature(s), the category is dense. If they vary independently of the relevant features, the category is sparse.
Thus, statistical density expresses the relationships among features within a category as well as within an
entire set of items. A particularly interesting feature of this metric is that statistical density is a continuous
spectrum: categories can be very dense, very sparse, or anywhere in between.
This framework also outlines two systems used to learn categories with different densities. Dense cate-
gories are best learned by the compression-based system, which takes input and reduces it by representing
some but not all features. With more instances, relevant features for a given category will be represented
more frequently and survive the compression. In contrast, features that appear infrequently will be mostly
filtered out. The compression-based system does not use conscious selection to determine which features
are represented. Instead, redundant and probable features are more likely to continue on. The many cor-
related features of a dense category are easily extracted using this system, which is quite similar to the
associative system outlined in the current study.
The second learning system is called the selection-based system. This system directs attention towards
relevant features, samples those features for later representation, and subsequently learns by aiming to
reduce error. As feedback is encountered, the system shifts attention from those dimensions that create
categorization errors to those that do not. The selection-based system relies heavily on multiple aspects
of executive function, including inhibition and selection. It is best for learning sparse categories. While
over time the compression-based system would be able to learn sparse categories, as the freely varying
irrelevant features would eventually be less frequent than relevant features, this process would be much
more inefficient than selecting and testing individual features. The selection-based system is Sloutsky’s
version of the hypothesis-testing system. Some research shows that sparse categorization is correlated
with performance on a flanker task, which is often used to measure selection and inhibition (Perry & Lupyan,
2016). This suggests that at least some executive functions are related to sparse category learning.
The statistical density framework also discusses the development of these two systems. It suggests that
children have access to the compression-based system early in development, as its mechanisms involve
brain structures that develop relatively early, such as inferiotemporal cortex (Rodman, 1994). In contrast,
the selection-based system involves more frontal regions that develop later, such as dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Eshel et al., 2007; D. Lewis, 1997; Segalowitz & Davies, 2004). Thus,
this framework posits that the compression-based system develops before the selection-based system.
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Sloutsky and others have done some studies on different age groups testing the two systems with categories
of different densities to verify this claim.
Kloos & Sloutsky (2008) tested both of these systems in children and adults. They engaged the two sys-
tems separately by modifying task demands. Some participants learned novel categories by being taught
the rules for inclusion (e.g., ”Ziblets have a short tail.”). This engaged the selection-based system. Other
participants learned these categories by viewing a series of instances, engaging the compression-based
system. Thus, the authors tested how well individuals could learn novel categories of different densities
depending on whether the category density matched the system being engaged by the task instructions.
For both children and adults, learning performance was high when the category density and task instruc-
tions matched. However, while the adults were able to adapt and learn the categories in mismatch condi-
tions, children were specifically unable to learn sparse categories just by viewing multiple instances. This
suggests that children are not able to use the selection-based system without direct guidance from task
instructions.
Other evidence for the developmental course of the two systems comes from a study of infants and
adults. This study used a switching paradigm to investigate whether individuals were selecting specific fea-
tures (using the selection-based system) or processing the entire stimulus holistically (using the compression-
based system). They found that when viewing sparse categories, adults showed a significant switch cost as
the category-relevant feature was changed, while infants did not. This indicates that adults viewing sparse
categories were focusing on a specific feature, while infants were processing the entire stimulus. Eye move-
ment data also suggested that even though infants were processing stimuli holistically, they were still able
to learn sparse categories (Best et al., 2013). Thus, this study found that adults and infants used different
systems for learning the same categories.
A similar finding comes from a study of change detection. One study found that while both children and
adults showed high accuracy when detecting change in a cued stimulus, children were better than adults
at detecting change in task-irrelevant stimuli. Similar results were found when children and adults were
asked to perform familiarity judgments on items seen during a visual search task: high performance for
both groups when probing relevant features, and higher performance for children than adults when probing
irrelevant features (Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017). The results from both of these experiments suggest that
children attend to a stimulus in a diffuse manner, even when task demands suggest a selective strategy.
This is consistent with a later-developing selection-based system, as children may be processing these
features using the compression-based system, which preserves even category-irrelevant features.
Thus, the statistical density approach to category learning provides two major points for consideration.
First, the statistical density metric itself emphasizes the idea that there aren’t two distinct types of categories
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(e.g., rule-based and similarity-based). Instead, categories exist on a spectrum ranging between these
extremes. It is still unknown how a dual-system model would deal with stimuli that lie directly in the middle
of this spectrum, however. Second, this framework is one of only a few that describes a developmental
trajectory for a dual-systems framework of category learning.
1.1.5 Verbal/nonverbal
Like some of the approaches discussed above, the verbal/nonverbal approach is a dual-systems model of
category learning. While other approaches discuss the role of language in category learning, none make
it as central as this approach by Minda & Miles (2010). The two systems in this approach are called the
verbal and nonverbal systems. These systems align well both with the framework outlined in this paper
as well as with other approaches. The verbal system uses hypothesis testing to determine the verbal rules
best suited to characterize a category. In contrast, the nonverbal system uses associative mechanisms to
learn categories, iteratively learning which features go together in predicting category membership.
A unique feature of this approach to category learning is its emphasis on traditional models of working
memory and their role in the category learning process. Minda & Miles (2010) state that the verbal system
relies heavily on working memory, especially the phonological loop and central executive, to rehearse and
select potential rules (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The nonverbal system, meanwhile, uses the visuospatial
sketchpad to store and rehearse visual information but overall uses working memory to a lesser extent than
the verbal system. Evidence for these hypotheses comes from a study showing that children, who have
fewer working memory resources than adults, exhibited adult-like performance when learning categories
using the nonverbal system and reduced performance for categories that required use of the verbal system.
This study also showed that adults showed more child-like performance when learning categories suited to
the verbal system (i.e., those involving category rules) while under concurrent verbal load, suggesting that
the verbal system indeed needs verbal working memory resources (Minda et al., 2008).
While the two systems described in Minda & Miles (2010) are quite similar to the systems hypothesized
in this paper, there remains a core difference: the nonverbal system does not posit a role for language. This
is likely due to the way Minda & Miles (2010) ground their dual-systems model in working memory. As will
be discussed shortly, language can be very useful even for iterative, association-based learning, although
perhaps not in the form of a verbal working memory resource. Thus, the verbal/nonverbal dual-systems
model of category learning provides us with evidence that verbal working memory and executive resources
support category learning in the hypothesis-testing system but does not fully consider the ways in which
language may influence use of the associative system.
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1.1.6 Taxonomic/thematic
As these previous frameworks have shown, when considering categories we must think carefully about
how the items in a category relate to each other. The taxonomic/thematic framework is yet another way to
consider relations within categories. Taxonomically related items are those we might think of as belonging
to the same everyday category (e.g., animals, plants, tools, etc.). However, at more superordinate levels
(e.g., mammal), taxonomic categories can be somewhat rule-based. Thematically related items are those
that go together in everyday life but are not necessarily part of the same category (e.g., needle and thread,
apple and worm).
Similar to and perhaps even more so than the statistical density approach, the taxonomic/thematic
framework has been able to provide many valuable insights about the developmental trajectory of catego-
rization. The typical task in this line of research is a grouping task, where individuals are given a set of
items and asked to group the ones that are ”alike” or ”the same.” Early research on this topic suggested
that children primarily categorize items using thematic relations in kindergarten and switch to taxonomic
relations later in childhood, although even this early work indicated that young children are able to use
taxonomic relations if necessary (Piaget et al., 1964; Vygotsky, 1962). Smiley & Brown (1979) found that
the preference for taxonomic versus thematic relations switches between first and fifth grade as well as
between college and old age, such that the very young and the elderly both show a preference for thematic
relations. However, in another study, college-aged adult participants chose a thematically-related item more
frequently in a triad task across ten different experiments, including one with the same stimuli used in Smiley
and Brown’s paper (Lin & Murphy, 2001).
Rather than being tied directly to age or ability, the preference for thematic or taxonomic classification
may depend on an individual’s goals. Markman & Hutchinson (1984) had children between the ages of 2 and
4 complete a triad task. The children were shown a target picture (e.g. a tennis shoe) as well as two options:
one that was taxonomically related (e.g., a high-heeled shoe) and one that was thematically related (e.g.,
a foot). The children were then asked to ”find the one that is the same.” With these directions, the children
chose the thematically-related object about half of the time. However, when a novel label was applied to
the task (e.g., ”This is a dax. Can you find another dax?”), the children were more likely to choose the
taxonomically related item. Thus, having a category label focused the task and directed attention towards
taxonomic category structure rather than thematic relations. This is consistent with research showing that
preschoolers undergoing a vocabulary training program show a taxonomic preference on unrelated items
and that their performance on taxonomic categorization predicts word knowledge on untrained items (Kaefer
& Neuman, 2013). Thus, attention towards words and labels may shift young children to a taxonomic
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preference. Further research in children between the ages of 2 and 4 manipulated many parts of the typical
triad task, including experimenter instructions and medium of presentation (pictures vs. physical objects).
They found that the thematic preference seen in Smiley & Brown (1979) seemed to be strongly affected
by task instructions and age (Waxman & Namy, 1997). Some research suggests that what is developing
in young childhood is not a sensitivity to different types of relations but instead the ability to flexibly switch
between thematic and taxonomic relations according to task demands (Blaye & Bonthoux, 2001).
Patient studies shed additional insights into the processes underlying taxonomic and thematic catego-
rization. A study of fluent and non-fluent aphasics showed that those with non-fluent aphasia exhibited
specific deficits in thematic processing, while those with fluent aphasia showed more difficulty in taxonomic
processing (Vivas et al., 2016). Another study on individuals with focal brain lesions found double dissocia-
tions based on stimulus modality (pictorial vs. verbal) for thematic items but not for taxonomic items (Vivas
et al., 2014). The authors interpreted this result to mean that thematic relations can be stored in different
ways based on modality, while taxonomic relations are stored and processed in a more integrated man-
ner. Together, these studies suggest that while taxonomic and thematic forms of processing likely share
resources, they are not entirely overlapping.
Taxonomic and thematic categories and processing share many similarities with the approaches dis-
cussed above. Taxonomic categories are like similarity-based categories. Both are what a typical individual
would consider to be a ”category;” they include natural kinds and artifacts. In contrast, thematic categories
are more similar to rule-based categories. Both can be defined using a rule like ”usually found in a kitchen”
or ”used for sewing.” Thinking about rule-based categories in terms of thematic relations brings a new as-
pect to these categories: situational similarity. Often, rule-based categories are ad hoc, or created for and
bound to a certain situation (e.g., things to be sold at the garage sale). Thus, when we think about how we
learn and process rule-based categories using the hypothesis-testing system, we should keep in mind how
we use our knowledge of situations or episodes in categorization.
1.2 The role of the label in category learning
Much theory and research has considered how having a single word for a category or concept affects how
an individual learns and processes that category. In this study, we will consider the word form associated
with a given category (either spoken or written) to be the category label. Thus, a category has two potential
pieces. First, there is the category’s meaning, or the way in which members belong to a category. As
discussed previously, this can be a set of defined rules (e.g., anything you plan to sell is a part of the
category things to sell at the garage sale) or an implicit set of fuzzy category boundaries (e.g., the ways
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in which you judge whether an item is a chair). The second piece of the category is its label. Individuals
learning new categories often learn both the meaning and the label.
There have been multiple viewpoints on just how labels interact with the category or concept they de-
scribe and refer to. One line of thought postulates that labels are attached to concepts that can be formed
in their absence (Gillette et al., 1999; Snedeker & Gleitman, 2004). This framework tends to focus on
early-acquired object concepts, which are thought to be built nonverbally by the infant before language is
acquired. Experiments done under this framework reveal interesting and important findings about the in-
formation that best supports a mapping between a category meaning and its label (e.g., having a syntactic
frame for a category label leads to much quicker learning than just observing the use of the label in multi-
ple situations). However, this viewpoint places little importance on the interplay between the label and the
meaning; at best, the label is an additional way to access the meaning but does not seem to differ from any
other feature.
Other researchers suggest that labels dynamically interact with meanings, and that having a single
word for a meaning fundamentally changes how individuals think about and even perceive a category. In
the words of Waxman & Markow (1995), words (labels) are ”invitations to form categories”. When a child
encounters a novel word form applied to an object, they are initially biased to interpret that word form
as a label for a category rather than the name of that singular object. Indeed, receiving a label for a
category helps 12-month-old infants focus on common features more than just directive speech (Althaus &
Mareschal, 2014). In adults, labels promote category learning even when they are redundant, and they do
so even more than additional nonverbal features (Lupyan et al., 2007). Even more interestingly, having a
label can change perceptual processing across development. Infants shown a certain set of objects without
an accompanying label will sort these objects into multiple categories using visual features. However, if a
single label is applied to the same set of objects, infants as young as 9 months will create only one category
(Havy & Waxman, 2016; Plunkett et al., 2008). In adults, hearing category labels affects visual perception.
Participants asked to find 2s or 5s in a visual display showed better accuracy and shorter reaction time
when hearing “two” or “five” immediately before the display appeared (Lupyan & Spivey, 2010).
The evidence cited above suggests that labels are special in some way—they are not simply additional
features of fully-formed concepts. This may be because labels encourage individuals to focus on features
that are more diagnostic (i.e., more often associated with members of a category) rather than features
that are specific to a given instance. A number of studies from Lupyan and colleagues support this idea.
For example, Edmiston & Lupyan (2015) found that adults tended to look at more typical instances of a
category when hearing a label. Thus, when hearing the word ”bird,” participants were more likely to look
at a robin (a more typical bird) than a penguin (a less typical bird). They also found that when listening to
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sounds associated with a category (e.g., bird chirp), participants tended to look at more likely sources of the
sound (e.g., images of birds with their mouths open). This suggests that labels activate a typical, abstracted
representation of a category while other sounds activate a more specific instance of that category that is
congruent with the sound itself.
Similar findings come from a study looking at the formal category triangles. Triangles are by definition
figures with three sides—any figure with three sides can be labeled a triangle. However, Lupyan (2017)
found that typicality effects for triangles were introduced when the word “triangle” was used. When asked
to draw a triangle, participants most often drew isosceles or equilateral triangles with their base parallel
to the horizontal (i.e., more canonical triangles). However, when instructed to draw a three-sided figure,
participants drew a variety of triangles. The same typicality-related pattern of results was found for multiple
other tasks, including typicality judgments, speeded recognition, and shape judgment. Another study found
that pairing category instances with labels increased fixations on category-relevant features, as compared
to pairing them with random words or silence, even for sparse categories (Barnhart et al., 2018). This study
used an associative learning environment, where participants viewed many instances, were not asked
to make category judgments, and were not provided any feedback on categorization. Thus, when the
associative system is engaged, labels draw attention towards the most category-relevant features available.
This phenomenon is related to other research showing that other seemingly rule-based categories (e.g.,
grandmothers, odd numbers) show typicality effects (Armstrong et al., 1983; Lupyan, 2013). Armstrong
and colleagues suggest that typicality effects are seen in what might be considered rule-based categories
because these categories are defined both by rules for inclusion (e.g., having a grandchild) as well features
that are used in identification (e.g., gray hair, tendency to bake cookies). This line of reasoning implies a
continuum between rule-based and similarity-based categories, where categories with definite and verbal-
izable rules for inclusion are subject to the type of processing most often associated with similarity-based
categories. Thus, having a label for a category changes how individuals process that category, even when
it has clearly-defined rules for inclusion.
Insight into why this might be the case comes from the Attentional Learning Account (ALA; Smith et al.,
2002; Yoshida & Smith, 2005). The ALA posits that infants and young children extract statistical regularities
from their environment and then use that knowledge to direct their attention towards future learning. For
example, early-acquired words in English often refer to objects that are grouped based on their shape (e.g.,
ball). This regularity teaches the child to direct their attention towards shape when they learn a novel word.
Children who are taught this regularity specifically in the laboratory also show greater vocabulary growth
than untrained peers (Smith et al., 2002).
When thinking about the ALA, it is important to discuss the use of the word ”attention.” Attention can be
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driven either by the individual (endogenous) or by the environment (exogenous). In the endogenous case,
the individual expends effort to focus on specific aspects of the stimulus (Engle & Kane, 2004). Alternatively,
the environment can direct an individual’s attention to these different aspects. This exogenous case is more
similar to the way attention is described in the ALA. As the individual learns that certain features tend to
co-occur in a given stimulus (e.g., the name and shape of an object), an instance of one of those features
draws attention towards the other. Since the label of a category is perhaps its most frequent feature, it
co-occurs most often with other frequent (i.e., typical) features of that category. Thus, the typicality effects
seen specifically for category labels may be the result of individuals learning statistical regularities between
labels and features.
Evidence for this bidirectional relationship can be seen in a number of studies. One study found that
early acquisition of object labels is facilitated by the presence of perceptually salient object parts, and that
this effect is stronger in children with larger vocabularies (Poulin-Dubois et al., 1995). Additionally, 4-year-
olds will extend properties about categories broadly when two items in the same category have the same
label. However, when two items in the category have the same adjective or sticker, children are reluctant to
extend properties to category members with low visual similarity (Graham et al., 2012). This suggests that
by age 4, children have learned some of the statistical regularities that go along with category labels and
use them in making decisions about category members. Labeling also helps infants distinguish between
visually similar items, supporting category learning further (Pickron et al., 2018; Switzer & Graham, 2017).
Thus, even in young infants, there is a two-way relationship between learning about objects and learning
category labels.
This type of iterative learning where feature distributions are learned over time closely matches the
associative system. In contrast, the hypothesis-testing system is much more focused on selecting one or a
few relevant features and discarding those that do not characterize category membership. In fact, many of
the categories best learned by the hypothesis-testing system (e.g., ad hoc categories) do not have a single-
word category label. Thus, a core hypothesis of this dissertation is that category labels affect learning in the
associative system but not in the hypothesis-testing system. In the next section, I will discuss how language
might play a role in the hypothesis-testing system.
1.3 Language and executive function in category learning
Most of the approaches discussed above specifically posit a role of language in the hypothesis-testing
system. For example, interfering with language resources specifically affects the low-dimensional, rule-
based categorization most suited to this system (Lupyan, 2009; Minda et al., 2008). However, these studies
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tend to focus on tying up language processing resources during categorization. This taps a different as-
pect of language than studies like Lupyan et al. (2007), which focuses on the presence or absence of a
language-related feature. I propose that the language resources necessary for the hypothesis-testing sys-
tem are those involved in and supporting executive functions. The hypothesis-testing system involves many
executive functions (e.g., selecting and maintaining relevant category rules, inhibiting irrelevant rules). Addi-
tionally, both inhibitory control and working memory have been shown to be related to rule-based category
learning (Rabi & Minda, 2014). Below, I will show how language and executive function work together,
especially for tasks relevant to the hypothesis-testing system.
Language ability and executive function have been shown to be related to varying degrees in multiple
studies. For example, Figueras et al. (2008) found significant positive correlations between language mea-
sures such as vocabulary and receptive grammar and a wide variety of executive function tasks for school-
age children. Berninger et al. (2017) found that performance on inhibition and verbal fluency sub-tests of the
D-KEFS, a standardized measure of executive function, was correlated with language outcomes in children
between the ages of 9 and 15. Additionally, children with specific language impairment have been shown to
have some executive function deficits, specifically in updating and inhibition (Im-Bolter et al., 2006). How-
ever, findings have been more mixed for the nature of the causal relationship between these skills. One
study found a strong concurrent relationship between language and executive function longitudinally for chil-
dren between ages 4 and 9, but no cross-lagged effects, suggesting that language and executive function
are not directly influencing each other (Gooch et al., 2016). However, another study found that language
ability at 2-3 years predicts executive function at 4 years (L. J. Kuhn et al., 2014). Thus, it is possible that
the relationship between executive function and language ability changes over development. Regardless,
language and executive function at least develop concurrently.
More evidence for the relationship between executive function and language comes from research in
adults showing that interfering with verbal resources, usually through articulatory suppression, can neg-
atively impact task switching, an executive function useful for switching between potential category rules
during rule-based category learning (Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003). In a task-switching
paradigm, performance typically decreases when an individual has to switch between tasks as compared
to when they can perform the same task repeatedly. This decrease in performance is known as the switch
cost. Articulatory suppression provides verbal interference by having the participant use language-related
resources to repeat a nonsense string (e.g. “the the the”). In 6- and 9-year-old children, articulatory sup-
pression has been shown to impair performance during task-switching but not during a flanker (inhibition)
task (Fatzer & Roebers, 2012).
Interestingly, the negative effect of articulatory suppression on task switching is specific to instances
15
where the individual must represent the task rules internally. For example, if participants must switch
between different arithmetic functions such as addition and subtraction, verbal interference does not have
an effect when the plus, minus, and equal signs are printed on the page (Baddeley et al., 2001). A similar
effect is found in a task-switching paradigm where participants must pay attention to different features of a
stimulus. When the cue is the whole word (e.g., shape, color, etc.), articulatory suppression has no effect
on switch cost. However, when the cue is just one letter (e.g., S, C, etc.), articulatory suppression increases
the switch cost (Miyake et al., 2004). This effect suggests that task switching in these instances requires
a participant to use language to represent and formulate task rules (Cragg & Nation, 2010). These results
indicate that language is important for representing and selecting rules, which may be similar to how the
hypothesis testing system learns rule-based categories.
In summary, language and executive function interact to support processing that is used by the hypothesis-
testing system for rule-based category learning. While labels are the most important aspect of language for
the associative system, language processing and its interaction with executive function are most important
for the hypothesis-testing system.
1.4 Interaction between category learning systems
While much research has focused on outlining dual-systems models of categorization, very little research
has investigated how these two systems might interact. Both COVIS and the verbal/nonverbal approach
suggest that the two systems in a dual-systems model operate in parallel. Stimuli are processed by both
systems, but category decisions are made using the faster system or the system with the strongest evi-
dence. However, some research suggests that the hypothesis-testing system may be the default. Behav-
ioral studies encouraging participants to switch between hypothesis-testing and associative strategies in a
perceptual category learning task show that unless participants are cued towards which type of strategy
to use on a given trial, they tend to use hypothesis-testing strategies for all trials (Ashby & Crossley, 2010;
Erickson, 2008). When participants are given cues on which type of strategy to use, many participants can
successfully switch between associative and hypothesis-testing strategies, but this type of switching is more
difficult than switching between different hypothesis-testing strategies (Crossley et al., 2018). In addition,
participants will use a verbal rule when it is available, even if it produces suboptimal categorization (Nose-
worthy & Goode, 2011). This suggests that the hypothesis-testing system can overpower the associative
system when both are equally activated. Still, this line of research requires much more empirical evidence
before definitive claims can be made.
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1.5 Summary and overview of the current study
So far, I have shown evidence across six different theoretical approaches for a dual-systems model of
category learning. Further, I have discussed literature suggesting that different aspects of language are
involved in the two systems. Finally, I have pointed out the need for more research on how these two
systems interact. This document addresses these ideas and predictions with two experiments, which I
explain below.
Experiment 1 investigates the relationship between the associative and hypothesis-testing systems.
Almost all of the studies discussed above utilize a between-subjects design to avoid transfer effects in
learning. As such, it is still unclear how an individual switches between the systems in response to task
demands and stimulus characteristics. Furthermore, some research suggests that low-language individuals
have difficulty switching category learning strategies (Ryherd & Landi, 2019). Thus, this experiment tests
effects of order on category learning performance across language ability. Given the results discussed in
section 1.4, I expect that individuals will show specific difficulty disengaging the hypothesis-testing system
but not the associative system. This will be reflected in poorer performance in associative blocks that take
place after hypothesis-testing blocks, as compared to than those that are before hypothesis-testing blocks.
Furthermore, I expect that this difficulty will be greater for individuals with lower overall language ability.
The results of this experiment will provide useful theoretical insight as well as practical insight into order
considerations for dual-systems category learning tasks in a within-subjects design.
I use Experiment 2 to answer two questions. First and foremost, I test the core hypothesis that the as-
sociative system is shaped by labels while the hypothesis-testing system relies on the interaction between
language and executive functioning. I use vocabulary as a proxy for labeling in this experiment. Thus, I ex-
pect to see a strong relationship between vocabulary and associative category learning as well as between
executive function and hypothesis-testing category learning. I expect to see either a weak relationship or no
relationship between associative category learning and executive function and between hypothesis-testing
category learning and vocabulary.
Finally, Experiment 2 will also be one of the first studies to directly compare category learning ap-
proaches within subjects. I use three different category learning paradigms (from the COVIS, statistical
density, and taxonomic/thematic approaches) to measure category learning ability. I expect to see signif-
icant effects of system (associative vs. hypothesis-testing) on performance within each paradigm, but no
effects of paradigm on performance. This would suggest that these approaches, which appear theoretically
similar, also tap the two systems in a similar manner empirically.
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2 Experiment 1
The goals for this experiment were twofold. First, I hoped to test order effects in a paradigm originally
designed to test a dual-systems model of categorization. Despite the fact that many approaches posit such
a model, only one approach (COVIS) has explicitly tested how a given individual switches between systems
for categorization (e.g., Ashby & Crossley, 2010; Erickson, 2008, described above). Most other studies
that compare different types of categorization do so in a between-subjects manner (e.g., Kloos & Sloutsky,
2008). Thus, this study is one of the first to look at the relationship between two categorization systems
using a non-COVIS within-subjects design. This task is also the first to test how individual differences in
language ability modulate this relationship.
This experiment also has a more practical purpose. One of the overarching goals of this dissertation is to
compare different paradigms of category learning. However, all studies using a statistical density approach
have been done between subjects, so we do not yet know if there are any transfer effects (i.e., effects of
order) for this type of task. In addition, no studies to date have tested for transfer effects along the spectrum
of language ability. This experiment carefully conducts three order analyses to fully understand the statis-
tical density category learning task, which comes from one of the dual-systems models discussed above.
This will benefit both practical understanding of this task as well as its underlying theoretical framework.
An interesting feature of the statistical density task is its two manipulations, each of which engages or
requires one of the two category learning systems. First, the instruction type engages either the associative
or the hypothesis-testing system by placing different task demands. Second, the stimulus requires a certain
category learning system. Recall that dense and sparse stimuli are best learned by different systems. Thus,
each block can either be a match (where the instruction type engages the ideal system for the stimulus type)
or a mismatch (where the instruction type engages the wrong system for the stimulus type).
To fully understand this task, I tested for order effects in both matching and mismatching conditions.
First, I tested order for the matching conditions. This analysis is the most simple and straightforward test of
order; can participants switch between systems when both the stimulus type and the learning type cue a
certain system? The second order analysis tested dense stimuli to see whether participants were able to
engage the associative system even when the learning instructions sometimes cued the hypothesis-testing
system. Further, if participants were unable to overcome the learning instructions and ended up using the
hypothesis-testing system in their first block, this analysis investigated whether they could switch to the
associative system in subsequent blocks following task demands. Finally, the third order analysis tested
sparse stimuli. Similarly, I tested whether participants could engage the hypothesis-testing system to learn
sparse stimuli even when task demands cued the associative system. This order analysis also tested the
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participants’ ability to subsequently switch away from the associative system.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Table 2
Group sizes for each order.
Analysis Group N
1 1 402 38
2 3 394 39
3 5 366 37
Data was collected from 236 undergraduate psychology students
at the University of Connecticut (161 Female, 67 Male, mean age =
18.94). Data for the category learning task was lost for 7 subjects
due to technical errors, which led to slightly unequal group sizes.
The final sample size was 229. Each subject was placed into one
of six groups. Each group completed two blocks of the category
learning task in a specific order (described below in detail).
2.1.2 Category learning task
This task measures learning of dense and sparse categories. It is based off of a paradigm from previous
research (Kloos & Sloutsky, 2008). Participants learn novel categories of items in four conditions stemming
from a 2 (learning type) x 2 (stimulus type) design. Table 3 summarizes how each experimental manipu-
lation corresponds to the theorized category learning systems. Learning type can be either supervised or
unsupervised. In supervised learning, participants learn the categories by being instructed on the relevant
features (e.g., “All friendly aliens have big noses.”). Images of the relevant features are provided along with
the descriptions. In unsupervised learning, participants learn the categories by viewing sixteen instances
of the category.
Table 3
Relationship between learning systems and experimental manipulations.
Experimental feature Hypothesis-testing Associative
Learning type Supervised Unsupervised
Stimulus type Sparse Dense
Categories in this exper-
iment can either be sparse
or dense. Category density
ranges from zero (where all
features vary freely) to one
(where all features co-occur
perfectly), based on a comparison between within- and between-category entropy (Sloutsky, 2010). All
categories in this experiment have seven dimensions. The sparse categories cohere on a single dimen-
sion, while the other dimensions vary freely (density = .25). In contrast, the dense categories cohere on
six of the seven dimensions (density = .75). The seventh dimension is allowed to vary freely. For more
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details on how density was calculated, see Appendix A. Stimuli for each of the four blocks are different. For
example stimuli, see Appendix B.
Table 4
Block orders for statistical density task.
Analysis Group First Block Second Block
1 1 Unsupervised-dense Supervised-sparse2 Supervised-sparse Unsupervised-dense
2 3 Unsupervised-dense Supervised-dense4 Supervised-dense Unsupervised-dense
3 5 Unsupervised-sparse Supervised-sparse6 Supervised-sparse Unsupervised-sparse
This task is mostly within-
subjects, with a between-subjects
factor of order. Based on the group
they were placed into, participants
completed two of the four possi-
ble learning-category type combi-
nations. In this experiment, I con-
ducted three different order analy-
ses. This design led to six possible order groups that each participant could be placed into (see Table
4).
In each block, participants were introduced to the task through a short cover story. They were told
to learn which items go with a certain property (e.g., which aliens are friendly). Crucially, no labels were
attached to the categories (e.g., some aliens are Ziblets). Then, participants completed a training block
(supervised or unsupervised; see Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Examples of the learning type manipulation for the category learning task.
During training, only members of the target category or its features were shown. After training, par-
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ticipants completed 40 test trials (16 target, 16 distractor, 8 catch). In each test trial, participants saw a
single item and used the keyboard to indicate whether the item matched the category they had just learned
(e.g., if the alien is friendly). Catch items looked significantly different than both the target and competing
categories, so participants should have always rejected them as members of the learned category. This
experiment was presented using PsychoPy v.1.84.2 (Peirce, 2007).
2.1.3 Behavioral measures
I used multiple assessments to test participants’ language ability. The choice of assessments was based
on the epiSLI criteria for language impairment (Tomblin et al., 1996), which includes comprehension, ex-
pression, vocabulary, grammar, and narrative. I adapted these requirements from a kindergarten population
to a college-aged population. The epiSLI criteria have been shown to be robust for diagnosis of specific
language impairment (SLI). In addition, other studies of language impairment more broadly have adapted a
similar multidimensional approach to measuring language ability, sometimes including measures of phono-
logical skills (Catts et al., 2006). Thus, using assessments that cover the many domains of language
outlined in epiSLI criteria allowed me to get a fuller picture of individual differences in language ability. See
Table 5 for a summary of the assessments and which domains of the epiSLI criteria they cover. The specific
tests used in this experiment are detailed below.
Test of word reading efficiency (TOWRE) phonemic decoding subtest. This subtest of the TOWRE
is a test of nonword fluency (Torgesen et al., 1992). This test is a part of the comprehension aspect of
epiSLI, since the comprehension measure is reading-based (Gough & Tunmer, 1986). In this subtest of
the TOWRE, individuals have 45 seconds to read as many nonwords as possible. The nonwords become
longer and more difficult as the list goes on. The raw score from the TOWRE was calculated by counting
the number of words correctly pronounced before the time limit. These raw scores were then converted to
standard scores using age-based norms. The standard scores for this task are based on a distribution with
a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. In the current age range, a perfect raw score (63) on the
TOWRE returns a standard score of ”>120.” For the purposes of this study, scores of ”>120” were trimmed
to 120.
Woodcock Johnson-III word attack (WA) subtest. This task measures nonword decoding accuracy
(Woodcock et al., 2001). Like the TOWRE, it is helpful for measuring the comprehension aspect of epiSLI.
Participants read a list of nonwords out loud at their own pace. Raw scores were calculated by counting
the number of words the participant said correctly. Raw scores were converted to standard scores using
age-based norms. The standard score distribution has a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.
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Computerized reading comprehension. This test covers the comprehension and narrative aspects of
epiSLI. This computerized reading comprehension (CRC) test is based on the Kaufman Test of Educational
Achievement (KTEA) reading comprehension subtest (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). To create this test, I
copied the passages and questions contained in the KTEA reading comprehension subtest into E-Prime
(Schneider et al., 2002) for presentation on a computer. Then, I created multiple choice answers for the
KTEA questions that did not already have them. In this task, participants read short expository and narrative
texts and answered multiple-choice comprehension questions about them. Some questions were literal,
while others required participants to make an inference. Participants completed as many questions as they
could in 10 minutes. Once 10 minutes had elapsed, the participant was allowed to answer the question
currently on the screen and then the assessment closed. Because this task is a modified version of the
KTEA, I used raw scores in analysis rather than standardized scores based on the KTEA norms. Raw
scores were calculated by counting the number of correctly answered questions for each participant.
Table 5
Assessments of language and their corresponding
epiSLI domains.
Test epiSLI Criteria
TOWRE Comprehension (decoding aspect)WA
CRC Comprehension, narrative
ND Vocab Vocabulary
CELF RS Grammar, expression
Nelson-Denny vocabulary subtest. The
Nelson-Denny vocabulary subtest is a written as-
sessment of vocabulary (Brown et al., 1981). This
test covers the vocabulary aspect of epiSLI. It
has been used in multiple studies of college-aged
adults and provides sufficient variability for individ-
ual difference investigations in this population (e.g.,
Boudewyn et al. 2015; Stafura & Perfetti 2014).
Participants were asked to choose the word closest to a target vocabulary word for 80 total items. Par-
ticipants were allowed unlimited time to complete all items. Raw scores were generated by counting the
total number of correctly answered items. The raw scores were then converted to standard scores based
upon a norming sample including students in 10th, 11th, and 12th grade as well as two- and four-year col-
lege students. The standard scores for this assessment have a mean of 200 and a standard deviation of
25.
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals recalling sentences subtest. I used the Recalling
Sentences subtest from the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Fourth Edition (CELF; Semel
et al. 2006) to cover the grammar and expression aspects of epiSLI. Participants heard sentences and
were asked to repeat them. Scoring was based on how many errors the participant made in their repetition.
Raw scores were calculated by adding up the number of points achieved for each item. These were then
converted to standard scores using age-based norms. The standard scores are based on a distribution with
a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 3.
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Raven’s Advanced Matrices. Finally, I used Set II of Raven’s Advanced Matrices (RAM) to measure
nonverbal IQ (Raven, 1998). In this task, participants saw a grid containing eight images and an empty
space. The images were arranged in the grid according to some rule or rules. Participants chose one of
eight additional images to fit in the empty space. Due to time constraints, I restricted participants to 10
minutes in this task. Since this administration is different than the standard administration, I did not use
standard scores. Raw scores were calculated by counting the number of correct answers given within 10
minutes.
2.1.4 Procedure
Each participant completed the category learning task as well as all of the behavioral measures. TOWRE,
WA, and CELF were audio recorded to allow for offline scoring. To allow multiple subjects to be run in a
single timeslot, some participants received tasks they could complete on their own (category learning, ND,
computerized reading comprehension, Raven’s) first while others completed tasks with the experimenter
first (WA, CELF, TOWRE). Together, the seven tasks took approximately one hour.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Category learning task data processing
For basic descriptive statistics on the category learning task, see Table 6. To process the category learning
task data, first all blocks where 5 or fewer catch items were correctly rejected were dropped from analysis.
This resulted in 22 total missing blocks (out of 458 total), including both blocks from a single subject in group
5. For all analyses shown below, accuracy was converted to d’ values (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004) using
the R package neuropsychology (Makowski, 2016). Correction for extreme values was done following
Hautus (1995). For reaction time, all incorrect trials were discarded. Then, outliers were removed on a
by-trial basis by calculating the mean and standard deviation of RTs within a given subject and block. Any
trial with an RT more than 2 SDs away from the mean was discarded.
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Table 6
Descriptive statistics for the category learning task.
Analysis Group Block Mean (SD) Accuracy Mean (SD) RT (ms)
1
1 Unsupervised-dense 0.91 (0.19) 958 (291)Supervised-sparse 0.93 (0.14) 705 (291)
2 Supervised-sparse 0.72 (0.34) 759 (385)Unsupervised-dense 0.90 (0.18) 742 (370)
2
3 Unsupervised-dense 0.91 (0.18) 963 (499)Supervised-dense 0.91 (0.23) 834 (429)
4 Supervised-dense 0.90 (0.21) 854 (482)Unsupervised-dense 0.92 (0.18) 777 (394)
3
5 Unsupervised-sparse 0.57 (0.35) 1166 (600)Supervised-sparse 0.93 (0.14) 715 (311)
6 Supervised-sparse 0.93 (0.12) 752 (353)Unsupervised-sparse 0.53 (0.38) 917 (470)
2.2.2 Behavioral measures
Table 7
Descriptive statistics for behavioral measures
Assessment Mean SD Range
CELF Recalling Sentences SS 10.7 1.86 3-14
Computerized Reading
Comprehension 21.7 5.12 7-48
Nelson-Denny Vocabulary SS 229 14.0 175-255
TOWRE SS 96.2 9.86 59-120
Word Attack SS 99.7 9.04 75-120
Raven’s Advanced Matrices 15.1 4.58 0-26
For basic descriptive statistics on the be-
havioral measures, see Table 7. Before
performing any statistical analyses using
these measures, I checked their normal-
ity using the D’Agostino normality test
from the R package fBasics (Wuertz et
al., 2017). Four measures (CRC, ND Vo-
cab, CELF RS, RAM) were significantly
skewed. These measures were centered, scaled, and transformed using Yeo-Johnson transformations
from R package caret (M. Kuhn, 2017). The remaining measures (TOWRE, WA) were not skewed and thus
were simply scaled and centered.
Since my goal was to create a composite measure of language ability, I investigated the relationship
between the behavioral measures. First, I constructed a correlation matrix between all of the behavioral
measures (see Table 8). All pairs of measures had a significant positve correlation, with the exception
of CELF RS and RAM. To further test whether the behavioral measures could be combined into a single
composite, I ran a principal components analysis (PCA) on the 5 assessments related to epiSLI (i.e., all as-
sessments except RAM). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin overall measure of sampling adequacy was 0.69, above
the commonly accepted threshold of 0.6. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also significant χ2(10) = 236.16, p
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<0.001. Both suggest that the 5 behavioral assessments were suitable for a PCA.
The first component in the PCA accounted for 47.74% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 2.38. All
of the factor loadings for this component were quite similar, ranging from -0.41 to -0.51. The second factor
accounted for an additional 20.5% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 1.02. This factor separated
the two measures involved in decoding (TOWRE and WA) from the other measures (CRC, ND Vocab, and
CELF RS). The remaining components had eigenvalues below 1. Thus, of the two significant components,
the first component explained almost half of the variance and had an eigenvalue more than double the
second component, which largely represented decoding ability. Since the first component indicated that
most of the measures loaded similarly, I decided to take a simple means approach to creating a language
composite measure.
The language composite measure was created by averaging the 5 scaled, centered, and/or transformed
measures. For participants with missing behavioral measures, the composite was created by averaging the
remaining available measures. No subject was missing more than 1 measure. This composite measure was
then scaled but not centered. This language composite measure and the centered, scaled, and transformed
RAM measure are used in the analyses investigating order effects reported below.
Table 8
Correlations between behavioral measures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Computerized Reading Comprehension -
2. Nelson-Denny Vocabulary 0.57*** -
3. CELF Recalling Sentences 0.31*** 0.40*** -
4. Raven’s Advanced Matrices 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.09 -
5. TOWRE 0.22** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.16*** -
6. Word Attack 0.22** 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.53*** -
Note. *p <0.05, **p <0.001, ***p <0.0001
2.2.3 Order analysis 1: matching conditions
The first analysis investigated order effects for blocks in which the learning type (supervised vs. unsuper-
vised) and category type (sparse vs. dense) both engaged the same category learning system (hypothesis
testing vs. associative). Participants completed supervised-sparse (hypothesis-testing) and unsupervised-
dense (associative) blocks.
Sensitivity. I used linear mixed-effects models to examine the effects of block and order on sensitivity
at test. Sensitivity in these models was measured by d’ values for each subject by block. The base model
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included random intercepts for subject. Adding block and order as fixed effects significantly increased model
fit, χ2(2) = 13.21, p = 0.001. Adding the interaction between block and order further improved model fit,
χ2(1) = 6.03, p = 0.014. Thus, the final model including only experimental conditions had fixed effects of
block, order, and the interaction between block and order as well as random intercepts for subject.
Figure 2. Sensitivity (d’) and reaction time for each block
completed by each group for order analysis 1. Points
indicate means with error bars reflecting standard error.
Shaded portions represent the distribution of sensitivity or
reaction time values.
This model revealed two significant effects.
First, there was a significant main effect of or-
der, F (1,75) = 8.60, p = 0.004. There was also
a significant interaction between block and or-
der, F (1,74) = 6.10, p = 0.02. There was not
a significant main effect of block, F (1,76) =
2.61, p = 0.11. The interaction was broken
down by conducting two separate models for
each of the orders (unsupervised-dense first
and supervised-sparse first). These analy-
ses showed that when the associative system
was engaged first (unsupervised-dense first),
there was no significant main effect of block,
F (1,36) = 0.014, p = 0.91. When the hypothe-
sis testing system was used first (supervised-
sparse first), there was a significant effect of
block, F (1,37) = 7.52, p = 0.009. This shows
that when participants complete engage the
hypothesis-testing system first, performance
on the supervised-sparse (hypothesis-testing)
block is lower than in the unsupervised-dense
(associative) block.
To investigate the effect of individual differ-
ences in language ability on the order effect,
I used the final model above which included
main effects for block and order as well as their interaction. I then added the language composite measure
as a fixed effect. I also added RAM to control for nonverbal IQ. This model revealed no significant effects
for RAM or the language composite; there remained a significant interaction between block and order.
Reaction time. Again, I used linear-mixed effects models to look at the effects of block and order on
26
reaction time at test. While the sensitivity measure was at the block level, reaction time here is modeled at
the item level. The base model included random intercepts for subject and for block nested within subject.
Adding the fixed effects of block and order increased the model fit, χ2(2) = 25.02, p <0.001. Further, adding
the interaction between block and order improved model fit, χ2(1) = 33.11, p <0.001.
This model showed three significant effects. There was a significant main effect of block, F (1,72) =
62.50, p <0.001. There was also a significant main effect of order, F (1,77) = 4.17, p = 0.04. Finally,
there was a significant interaction between block and order, F (1,72) = 40.49, p <0.001. To break down
this interaction, I ran follow-up models for each of the two orders. This showed that when the associative
system was engaged first (unsupervised-dense first), there was a significant main effect of block, F (1,36)
= 69.46, p <0.001. When the hypothesis testing system was used first (supervised-sparse first), there was
no significant effect of block, F (1,36) = 0.02, p = 0.88. This result is the opposite of what was found in
sensitivity. When the associative system is engaged first, there is a difference in reaction time between
blocks, but when the hypothesis-testing system in engaged first, there is no difference in reaction time.
Similar to the sensitivity analysis, I added RAM and language ability as fixed effects to the final reaction
time model from above. Neither had any effect on reaction time. The main effects and interactions from
above stayed significant.
Summary (see Fig. 2). While the findings from sensitivity and reaction time seem to be opposing, they
may in fact tell the same story. Group 1 engaged the associative system first. This group showed simi-
lar accuracy for both blocks but slower reaction time in their first block (unsupervised-dense/associative).
Group 2 engaged the hypothesis-testing system first. They showed similar reaction times for both blocks,
but lower accuracy in their first block (supervised-sparse/hypothesis-testing). Thus, both groups showed
reduced performance (reflected in either reaction time or sensitivity) in their first block, regardless of which
system it engaged, perhaps reflecting a general learning effect across the task as a whole. Importantly, this
learning effect is not modulated by language ability.
2.2.4 Order analysis 2: dense stimuli
The second order analysis compared groups 3 and 4. All participants learned only dense categories, with
the order of training types differing between groups.
Sensitivity. Again, I used linear-mixed effects models to investigate the effects of block and order on
sensitivity at test. The base model included random intercepts for subject. Adding the fixed effects to the
model did not significantly improve fit χ2(2) = 0.07, p = 0.97. Indeed, neither block, F (1,145) = 0.053, p =
0.82, nor order, F (1,145) = 0.016, p = 0.90, were significant predictors of accuracy. Thus, sensitivity at test
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for dense categories was similar regardless of training type or block order.
Figure 3. Sensitivity (d’) and reaction time for each block
completed by each group for order analysis 2. Points
indicate means with error bars reflecting standard error.
Shaded portions represent the distribution of sensitivity or
reaction time values.
Next, I conducted the individual differ-
ences analysis. Since the goal of this inves-
tigation was to see whether the relationship
between order and sensitivity in each block
changed as a function of language ability, I
created a model with fixed effects for block, or-
der, and language ability as well as RAM. The
model showed no significant effects of any of
the predictors.
Reaction time. I used the same linear
mixed-effects model as above, with random
intercepts for subject and for block nested
within subject in the base model. Adding fixed
effects of order and block did not significantly
improve model fit, χ2(2) = 3.38, p = 0.18.
Block, F (1,71) = 1.12, p = 0.29, and order,
F (1,76) = 2.28, p = 0.13, did not have any ef-
fect on reaction time. Adding language ability
and RAM to the model also did not improve
fit. These measures were not significant pre-
dictors of reaction time for dense stimuli.
Summary (see Fig. 3). There were no
significant effects of block, order, or language
ability found for dense stimuli. This may sug-
gest that learning dense stimuli engages a
single system regardless of the instructions. Alternatively, it may be that learning dense stimuli is over-
all an easy task, evidenced by the high sensitivity values seen in these blocks.
2.2.5 Order analysis 3: sparse stimuli
The third order analysis investigated differences in learning sparse categories based on learning type order,
using data from groups 5 and 6.
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Sensitivity. I used the same type of linear mixed-effect models as the prior two order effects, with
random intercepts for subject. Adding block and order significantly increased model fit, χ2(2) = 57.5, p
<0.001. However, adding the interaction between block and order did not increase model fit, χ2(1) = 0.33, p
= 0.56. Thus, the final model included fixed effects for order and block but not their interaction. This model
revealed a significant main effect of block, F (1,67) = 75.69, p <0.0001, but no significant main effect of
order, F (1,67) = 0.0008, p = 0.98. Participants showed significantly higher sensitivity in supervised-sparse
blocks than in unsupervised-sparse blocks (see Table 6).
Figure 4. Sensitivity (d’) and reaction time for each block
completed by each group for order analysis 3. Points
indicate means with error bars reflecting standard error.
Shaded portions represent the distribution of sensitivity or
reaction time values.
As in the two previous analyses, I added
RAM and language ability to the final model
above. Adding the language composite im-
proved model fit even after adding RAM, χ2(2)
= 5.34, p = 0.02. However, adding the block
x language and order x language interactions
did not improve model fit, χ2(2) = 1.94, p =
0.38. The final model, which included no inter-
actions, showed the same main effect of block
seen above as well as a significant main ef-
fect of language ability, F (1,63) = 5.21, p =
0.03. The effect of language ability was asso-
ciated with a positive coefficient (b = 0.19, SE
= 0.09), suggesting that sensitivity and lan-
guage ability were positively related. There
was no main effect of RAM.
Reaction time. As above, I used a lin-
ear mixed-effect model with random intercepts
for subject and block nested within subject
as the base model. Adding the fixed effects
of order and block significantly improved fit,
χ2(2) = 55.08, p <0.0001. In addition, adding
the interaction between block and order im-
proved fit, χ2(1) = 20.00, p <0.0001. The fi-
nal model showed significant main effects for
block, F (1,68) = 31.22, p <0.0001, order, F (1,70) = 5.04, p = 0.03, and a significant interaction between
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block and order, F (1,68) = 22.25, p <0.0001. Follow-up models showed that there was a significant differ-
ence in reaction time by block for each order. However, the difference between mean reaction time of the
two blocks for group 5 (unsupervised-sparse first) was 415 ms, while the difference for group 6 (supervised-
sparse first) was 163 ms. This suggests that the interaction represents a greater difference in reaction time
between blocks for participants who received the unsupervised-sparse block first.
Figure 5. Language ability is a significant predic-
tor of sensitivity (d’) for blocks in order analysis
3 (all containing sparse stimuli).
For the individual differences analysis, I added RAM
and the language composite to the final model from
above. Adding the language composite did not improve
the model fit. There was no effect of language ability on
reaction time for sparse stimuli.
Summary (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). In terms of ac-
curacy, participants showed higher sensitivity during the
supervised-sparse block than during the unsupervised-
sparse block, regardless of order. In addition, sensitivity
on all blocks was positively related to language ability.
This relationship did not vary by block or order. For reac-
tion time, there was an interaction between block and or-
der, but no effect of language ability. The unsupervised-
sparse block was by far the most difficult block for all participants who received it. Thus, this interaction
may reflect this block difference crossed with learning effects. Participants who received the unsupervised-
sparse block second were perhaps more comfortable with the task overall than participants who received
the unsupervised-sparse block first, which lead to faster reaction times for those receiving unsupervised-
sparse second.
2.3 Discussion
In this experiment, I tested three different order effects to see whether the order in which an individual
engages the two category learning systems affects their category learning performance. The two manipu-
lations in the statistical density task encouraged participants to use a particular system in two ways (learning
type and stimulus type; see Table 3 for a summary). The first analysis investigated whether block order af-
fected performance when both the learning type engaged and the stimulus type required the same system.
The second analysis tested the effect of block order on performance when all stimuli were dense, and the
third analysis did the same for only sparse stimuli.
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2.3.1 Order effects
The three analyses revealed what appears to be a general learning effect. It is most apparent in the
first analysis, which showed that when both learning type and stimulus type engage the same category
learning system, performance is better on the second block than on the first. Group 1 (unsupervised-
dense first) showed slower reaction times in their first block, while Group 2 (supervised-sparse first) showed
poorer sensitivity in their first block, even though the first block for each of these groups was different. This
result was also seen in a block by order interaction in the third analysis, where the difference between
blocks in reaction times attenuated when the more difficult block (unsupervised-dense) was encountered
second. Finally, while there were no significant effects in the second analysis, the mean reaction times were
numerically higher for first blocks than for second.
The core hypothesis for this experiment was that engaging the hypothesis-testing system before the
associative system would lead to reduced performance during associative blocks and that the reverse effect
would not appear. This hypothesis was based on previous research that showed that when participants
were required to switch between categories built using different category rules, they tended to rely more
on executive function even if they were not actually switching between rule types (Erickson, 2008). Other
research also has shown that when participants are asked to learn a hybrid category that combines different
rule types, they end up using only a simple rule-based strategy (Ashby & Crossley, 2010). Thus, when
individuals are bombarded with cues towards different systems on a trial-to-trial basis, they default to the
more explicit strategies, reflecting reliance on the hypothesis-testing system. However, this type of result
was not found in the current study. Instead of defaulting to the hypothesis-testing system and thus showing
reduced performance on unsupervised or dense blocks that occurred second, better performance was
almost always seen in second blocks. This may reflect a broad learning effect that was not seen in prior
studies.
Differences in experimental paradigm may at least partially explain why this study shows learning effects
while other studies show reliance on a single system. In the studies mentioned above, stimulus character-
istics encouraged participants to switch between systems on a trial-by-trial basis. In the current study, trials
were blocked and a single system was engaged for that block. Participants had short transition periods
between blocks were new instructions and examples or rules were presented. The results presented here
suggest that these transition periods were sufficient for participants to switch to a new system as stimulus
and task demands changed.
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2.3.2 Individual differences
The original hypothesis for this analysis was that individuals with poorer language ability would show
stronger order effects than those with better language ability. My prior research has shown that low-
language individuals exhibit difficulty switching away from suboptimal learning strategies that were devel-
oped in the absence of guided instruction (Ryherd & Landi, 2019). Thus, I expected to see an interaction
between language ability and order such that individuals with better language skills would show minimal
costs when switching between unsupervised and supervised tasks, while those with poorer language skills
would show a large switch cost. However, no interactions between language ability and order were found.
The third analysis revealed the only significant effect of language ability. This analysis showed that
language ability was positively related to sensitivity when all items in both blocks were sparse. Recall that
sparse items are best learned by the hypothesis-testing system. Since both blocks in the third order effect
analysis were sparse, an individual could succeed by only using this system. The effect of language on
category learning is often found only for the hypothesis-testing system (Lupyan, 2009; Lupyan & Mirman,
2013). Thus, this result is in line with previous findings.
This finding is especially interesting because it is one of the first to relate category learning performance
to individual differences in language ability in an adult sample. This topic has been much more extensively
studied in children and infants. For example, vocabulary and categorization have been shown to be posi-
tively correlated in 20-month-olds (Nazzi & Gopnik, 2001) and 24-month-olds (Jaswal, 2007). In addition,
infants’ categorization ability at 12 months predicts their concurrent and future (18 month) vocabulary size
(Ferguson et al., 2015). However, much of the individual differences category learning literature focuses on
skills like working memory or strategy use rather than language ability. Thus, this study is one of the first to
find that individual differences in language ability are related to categorization accuracy for novel rule-based
categories in adults.
2.3.3 Limitations and conclusions
While the category learning task used in this study was based off of prior research, it was modified for use
in a within-subjects design. To do this, I created different stimuli for each block (see Appendix B). Each
stimulus type (e.g, flowers) was tied to a particular block (e.g., supervised-dense). As such, differences
between blocks could be due to the specific stimuli that were created. For example, two of the four blocks
have animate stimuli (aliens, bugs) while the other two have inanimate stimuli (flags, flowers). Animacy has
been shown to affect how children extend category labels (Davidson et al., 2018). Adults also show better
memory for animate items than inanimate items (Bonin et al., 2014). This may have contributed to the main
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effect of system seen in the third order analysis; performance with inanimate items (flags) was worse than
performance with animate items (bugs). However, the blocks including inanimate items were unsupervised-
sparse, a block type that has been shown to be particularly difficult (Kloos & Sloutsky, 2008). Considering
that similar main effects of block were not seen in the second order analysis, which had a similar animate
(alien) vs. inanimate (flower) confound, it is unlikely that animacy affected performance in this task.
The category learning task would also have benefited from more data on the stimuli themselves. First,
it would be helpful to know more about the specific features chosen. The calculations for statistical density
include an attentional weight constant which is just assumed to be the same for all features and relations
among features. However, this weighting could certainly vary based on the salience of given features (e.g.,
smiles/frowns may be more salient for friendly/unfriendly aliens), leading to differences in statistical density.
Future work would benefit from more extensive norming to fully understand the statistical density of all
stimuli. In addition, the task was overall quite easy for the adult sample in this study, leading to some
undesired ceiling effects. More complicated stimuli (e.g., more dimensions, disjunctive rules for category
membership, etc.) might make the task difficult enough to fully probe category learning in an adult sample.
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to a theoretical understanding of how individuals switch
between category learning systems in a blocked design. In addition, it is the first study to test a statistical
density category learning paradigm within subjects. The findings suggest that this type of task does not
suffer from transfer effects. Instead, participants show modest learning effects, becoming faster and/or
more accurate in their second block. These learning effects do not vary by language ability. However,
language ability is related to categorization when all stimuli are sparse. Thus, this experiment supports the
idea that language ability (broadly defined) is related to categorization in the hypothesis-testing system.
33
3 Experiment 2
This experiment tested the core hypothesis of this dissertation. I used a within-subjects design to test
whether executive function is specifically related to categorization in the hypothesis-testing system while
verbal labels are specifically related to associative system categorization. This experiment also uses three
different category learning tasks, which allowed me to compare different category learning paradigms and
to test the core hypothesis for multiple approaches.
In this experiment, I use vocabulary as a proxy for labeling. Vocabulary measures should reflect the
link between a word and its meaning, as individuals must retrieve the meaning of a word from its label in
the task. Further, this link should be more elaborated than those built in a paired-associate learning task.
Thus, individual differences in vocabulary should give some insight into how well participants use labels
in learning categories. For executive function, I selected three different measures. Multiple studies have
shown that while executive function is sometimes talked about as a single construct, it actually is made
up of separable components (Karr et al., 2018; Miyake et al., 2000). The components I chose to focus on
were inhibition, switching, and planning. I made this decision in an effort to have some breadth in executive
function measurements.
Finally, I chose to compare the COVIS, statistical density, and taxonomic/thematic approaches to cate-
gory learning. These three approaches represent a broad spectrum of category learning. COVIS exclusively
focuses on perceptual categories, while the statistical density approach uses constructed stimuli that can be
mapped onto real-world objects to some degree. Finally, the taxonomic/thematic approach is almost always
applied to real-world objects that participants have directly experienced. Since these three approaches are
so different in the types of categories they try to explain, results showing similarities between them would
be strong evidence for an overarching dual-systems framework. I decided to use common paradigms from
each approach as a starting point for comparison rather than modifying the tasks to be more equivalent.
Given the theoretical similarities between the approaches, I hypothesize that task differences will not be
sufficient to affect how individuals use the two systems differently for each approach.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
186 participants were recruited from the psychology undergraduate participant pool at the University of
Connecticut (135 Female, 50 Male, mean age = 18.72). Not all subjects were used for all analyses; see
descriptions of each analysis for more details.
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3.1.2 Category learning tasks
This experiment used three different category learning tasks, each based on a different approach to cate-
gory learning. I used these three tasks to investigate whether the paradigms used in different approaches
engage category learning systems in a similar way. The order of category learning tasks was counterbal-
anced across participants. All category learning tasks were presented using PsychoPy v.1.84.2 (Peirce,
2007).
Sloustky statistical density task. This task used the same procedure and stimuli as the task described
in Experiment 1. However, instead of completing only two blocks, participants completed all four blocks.
Because the previous experiment showed few significant order effects, the order of the four blocks was
randomly generated for each participant.
Ashby perceptual category learning task. There were two versions to this task: Information-Integration
(II) and Rule-Based (RB). Participants completed the II version and then the RB version. Prior research has
shown that when participants are asked to switch between the declarative (hypothesis-testing) and implicit
(associative) systems, they end up using rule-based strategies from the declarative system for all trials.
Thus, by engaging the implicit system first, I aimed to reduce transfer effects between versions as much as
possible.
Figure 6. Parameters for Gabor patches for each version of the
Ashby perceptual category learning task.
In each version of the task, par-
ticipants were told that they would be
learning two categories and that per-
fect performance was possible. They
were also told to be as quick and ac-
curate as possible. In each trial, par-
ticipants viewed a Gabor patch that
belonged to one of the two categories.
Each patch subtended 11◦of visual
angle. The stimuli were generated us-
ing category parameters from a prior
study (Maddox et al., 2003; see Figure 6 for details). The participant then had 5000ms to press a key,
indicating which category they believed the stimulus belonged to. After a response, the participant received
feedback (”Correct” or ”Incorrect”). Feedback was presented for 1000ms, and then the next trial began. If
the participant took more than 5000ms to respond, they saw ”Too Slow” and proceeded to the next trial. Par-
ticipants completed three runs of each version. Each run had 80 trials (40 from each category) presented
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in a random order. Thus, in total participants completed 240 II trials and 240 RB trials.
Taxonomic/thematic task. This task was adapted from Murphy (2001) and Kale´nine et al. (2009).
There were also two versions of this task: one taxonomic and one thematic. Version order was counterbal-
anced across subjects, with some participants getting the taxonomic version first and others the thematic
version first. Most versions of this type of task allow participants to choose the item that is most ”semanti-
cally related,” and thus do not ask participants to make either taxonomic or thematic choices on any given
trial. As such, little research has looked at switching between taxonomic and thematic semantic judgments.
Counterbalancing was applied to control for order effects.
The stimuli were images taken from Konkle et al. (2010). I chose to use images in order to avoid
automatic language processing. While participants likely did engage linguistic resources during the task,
the use of pictures reduced the influence of stimulus features on language use. In each trial, four images
were presented: a target, a taxonomically-related item, a thematically-related item, and an unrelated item.
Taxonomically- and thematically-related items were chosen based on norms from Landrigan & Mirman
(2016) where available. The Landrigan & Mirman (2016) norms were based on word stimuli rather than
the images available from Konkle et al. (2010); as such, not all of the available images were normed. For
images without norming information, researcher judgment was used to pick items for each type of relation.
For each version, participants were told that they would be categorizing objects. They were told to
pick the option that ”goes best with” (thematic) or is ”most similar to” (taxonomic) the target item. These
instructions were based on previous research showing that slight differences in task instructions affect
taxonomic and thematic judgments (Lin & Murphy, 2001). After instructions, participants got five practice
trials. In each trial, the images were shown for 5000ms and participants had unlimited time to make a
response. The practice trials were identical for the taxonomic and thematic versions of the task. After each
response, participants received feedback (”Correct!” or ”Oops!”) for 1000ms. Once the practice trials were
completed, participants received 24 test trials. Test trials had the same feedback structure as practice trials.
While some images were seen in multiple trials, the 4-image combination for each trial was unique across
the taxonomic and thematic versions of the task.
3.1.3 Executive function tasks
To measure executive function, I used three different tasks taken from the Psychology Experiment Building
Language (PEBL) test battery (Mueller & Piper, 2014). I chose three tasks to try and tap multiple aspects of
executive function, including inhibition, planning, and task-switching. All three tasks were presented using
the PEBL software.
36
Flanker task (inhibition). This task was an implementation of the Eriksen & Schultz (1979) flanker
task, using a method similar to Stins et al. (2007). In each trial, participants viewed a set of five arrows
and were asked to respond based on the direction in which the center arrow was pointing (left or right).
In congruent trials, all arrows faced the same way. In incongruent trials, the four distractor arrows pointed
in the opposite direction of the target (center) arrow. In neutral trials, the four distractor arrows were just
horizontal lines without arrowheads. There were also blank trials, in which only the target arrow appeared.
Participants completed 40 trials in a 2 (direction; left, right) x 4 (condition; congruent, incongruent, neutral,
blank) design, for a total of 160 trials. Each trial began with a 500 ms fixation, followed by the stimulus
which appeared for 800ms. Participants were only allowed to respond during the 800ms that the stimulus
was on the screen. After a response, there was an inter-trial interval of 1000ms. Participants received 8
practice trials before the actual experiment to get used to the timing constraints. During practice trials, each
response was followed by feedback (”Correct”, ”Incorrect”) as well as a number indicating RT for that trial.
This feedback was not provided for the test trials.
Switcher task (task-switching). This task was taken from Anderson et al. (2012). In this task, par-
ticipants were presented with an array of colored shapes. Each colored shape had a single letter inside.
For each trial, a single shape was surrounded by a white circle, indicating it as the target shape. Based on
instructions at the top of the screen, participants were told to select a new shape that matched the target
shape on one of three dimensions (color, shape, or letter). Research from Miyake et al. (2004) has shown
that cueing a dimension using its entire name (e.g. ”shape”) does not require as many language resources
as cueing a dimension using a single letter (e.g., ”s”). Since one of the core hypotheses of this study was
that language supports executive functions in the hypothesis-testing system, I used a version of the switcher
task that cued dimension using just a single letter. I expect that this version of the task requires individuals
to represent dimensions/selection rules internally, similar to how they might represent possible category
rules when learning rule-based categories.
The task consisted of nine different arrays of ten shapes. For each array, participants made ten re-
sponses. In the first three arrays, participants switched between two of the three dimensions in a fixed
order (e.g., C - S - C - S). The relevant dimensions were different for each array. For the second three
arrays, participants switched between all three dimensions still in a fixed order (e.g., S - C - L - S - C - L).
The specific order was different for each array. Finally, in the last three arrays participants switched between
all three dimensions in a random order. Unlike previous arrays, in the last three participants were unable to
anticipate the upcoming relevant dimension. Each array had 12 cues.
Tower of London task (planning). This task was a computerized version of the one described in
Shallice (1982). In this task, participants were shown a setup of colored disks in three stacks as well as
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a target setup. They were given a limited number of moves to make their setup match the target setup.
Participants could only have one disk in their ”hand” at a time, and they could only pick the top disk up off
of any stack. The trials varied in the number of steps required to match the target setup from 2 to 5, with
easier (2 step) trials at the beginning of the task and harder (5 step) trials at the end of the task. Participants
were encouraged to take their time and plan out their moves before beginning each trial. There were a total
of 12 trials.
3.1.4 Behavioral measures
Finally, I used four different behavioral assessments to measure vocabulary, syntax, and nonverbal IQ.
Nelson-Denny vocabulary subtest. To measure vocabulary, I used the same Nelson-Denny vocabulary
subtest described in Experiment 1.
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals recalling sentences and formulated sentences
subtests. I used the CELF here to measure individual differences in syntax production and perception. The
Recalling Sentences subtest provided a measure of receptive grammar, while the Formulated Sentences
subtest measured expressive grammar. See Experiment 1 for a description of the Recalling Sentences
subtest. In the Formulated Sentences subtest, participants viewed a scene and were asked to make a
sentence containing a target word about that scene. Often, the target word encouraged certain syntactic
structures (e.g., ”because”). Raw scores were calculated based on use of the target word and errors in
syntax or semantics for each item. Like Recalling Sentences, Formulated Sentences were converted to
standard scores with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 3.
Raven’s Advanced Matrices. I used Raven’s Advanced matrices to measure nonverbal IQ, as de-
scribed in Experiment 1.
3.1.5 Procedure
Each participant completed all of the category learning and executive function tasks, as well as all of the
behavioral measures. CELF responses were audio-recorded to allow for offline scoring. To allow multiple
subjects to be run in a single timeslot, some participants received tasks in a shuffled order. All together, the
tasks and behavioral measures took about an hour and a half.
3.2 Results I: individual differences
Descriptive statistics for all individual difference measures can be found in Table 9.
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics for individual difference measures.
Measure Mean SD Range
Flanker Effect 55.2 27.3 -37.5-155
Switcher Effect 8026 13729 -28119-51916
Tower of London Accuracy 0.66 0.18 0.083-1.00
Nelson-Denny Vocab 230 14.2 177-255
Raven’s Advanced Matrices 15.1 4.73 0-26
CELF Recalling Sentences 11.1 1.68 6-14
CELF Formulated Sentences 12.5 1.17 9-14
Note. This table includes data from all 186 participants. Flanker and switcher effect measures are reported in millisec-
onds. Nelson-Denny Vocab and both CELF measures are standard scores.
Descriptive statistics for the category learning tasks can be found in Tables 10 and 11. These statis-
tics describe accuracy and reaction time aggregated by subject and block. For a review on which block
corresponds to which system in each paradigm, see Table 12.
Table 10
Descriptive statistics for category learning tasks – accuracy.
Paradigm Associative Hypothesis-testingMean SD Range Mean SD Range
Ashby perceptual 0.58 0.07 0.44-0.78 0.78 0.16 0.42-0.98
Sloutsky statistical density 0.95 0.08 0.60-1.00 0.93 0.12 0.20-1.00
Taxonomic/thematic 0.83 0.16 0.13-1.00 0.85 0.15 0.21-1.00
Note. This table includes data from all 186 participants.
Table 11
Descriptive statistics for category learning tasks – reaction time.
Paradigm Associative Hypothesis-testingMean SD Range Mean SD Range
Ashby perceptual 739 0241 154-1780 625 141 152-1040
Sloutsky statistical density 766 196 413-1380 658 144 380-1210
Taxonomic/thematic 1620 649 264-6030 1780 557 558-4280
Note. This table includes data from all 186 participants. Reaction times are reported in milliseconds.
3.2.1 Data processing
An a priori power analysis showed that 132 subjects would be needed for the individual difference analyses.
As is noted above, more than 132 subjects participated in the experiment. Due to the many assessments
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being collected, issues with the experimental paradigm, and experimental time constraints, there was a
considerable amount of data missingness. Thus, each analysis discussed below uses the first 132 subjects
with full data for all measures included in that analysis.
Ashby perceptual category learning task. For this task, II blocks were labeled as associative and RB
as hypothesis-testing. Accuracy and reaction time were measured for this task. Accuracy was summarized
by subject and system. For reaction time, only accurate trials were used. In addition, reaction times that
were recorded as a negative value were removed, as these trials indicate a participant pressed a key
before the stimulus appeared. Then, outliers were removed on a by-trial basis by calculating the mean
and standard deviation of reaction times within a given subject and system. Any trial with a reaction time
more than 2 SDs away from the mean was discarded. Then, reaction time was summarized by subject and
system. A single subject had reaction times 8 SD higher than the mean; this subject’s data was removed
and replaced with another subject. Accuracy and reaction time were then Yeo-Johnson transformed to
reduce skewness, as well as centered and scaled.
Sloutsky statistical density task. In this task, the unsupervised-dense block was considered to en-
gage the associative system, and the supervised-sparse block was considered to engage the hypothesis-
testing system. The other two blocks were discarded. Any participants who did not respond correctly to
at least 6 of the 8 catch trials for a given block were removed from future analyses. Thus, all subjects
reported in analyses using this task had at least 75% accuracy on catch trials in both blocks. Accuracy was
summarized by subject and system. Reaction time outliers were removed on a by-trial basis as described
above and reaction time was then summarized by subject and system. Accuracy and reaction time were
then transformed, centered, and scaled.
Taxonomic/thematic task. For this task, taxonomic blocks were associative and thematic blocks were
hypothesis-testing. Practice trials were discarded before analysis. Accuracy was summarized by subject
and system. Reaction time outliers were removed using the same method as above, and then reaction time
was summarized by subject and system. Accuracy and reaction time were then transformed, centered, and
scaled.
Table 12
Associative and hypothesis-testing blocks for each paradigm.
Paradigm Associative Hypothesis-testing
Ashby perceptual Information-integration Rule-based
Sloutsky statistical density Unsupervised-Dense Supervised-Sparse
Taxonomic/thematic Taxonomic Thematic
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Flanker task. The flanker effect was calculated by first selecting only incongruent or congruent trials.
Then, the average reaction time for each trial type was calculated by subject. Finally, the average reaction
time for congruent trials was subtracted from the average reaction time for incongruent trials for each sub-
ject. This measure reflecting the flanker effect was then centered and scaled but not transformed, as it was
not shown to be significantly skewed.
Switcher task. The switcher effect was calculated by selecting the arrays in the 3-dimension ordered
and 3-dimension random blocks. Within each array, the median reaction time for each cue was calculated.
Then, average reaction time was calculated for each block. Finally, the reaction time for 3-dimension or-
dered was subtracted from the reaction time for 3-dimension random. This measure was then transformed,
centered, and scaled.
Tower of London task. The metric calculated for this task was percentage of trials correct. This
measure was then transformed, centered, and scaled.
Nelson-Denny, CELF, RAM. Nelson-Denny and CELF were both standardized using their respective
norms. Raven’s was not standardized. All 4 measures (Nelson-Denny vocabulary, CELF Recalling Sen-
tences, CELF Formulated Sentences, and Raven’s Advanced Matrices) were all transformed, centered, and
scaled.
Table 13
Correlations between individual difference measures.
Measure 1 2 3 4
1. Nelson-Denny Vocab -
2. Tower of London Accuracy 0.21 -
3. Switcher Effect -0.06 -0.03 -
4. Flanker Effect -0.05 -0.06 0.08 -
5. Raven’s Advanced Matrices 0.44* 0.26* -0.19 -0.04
Note. *p<0.05, Bonferroni-corrected. This table includes data from all 186 participants.
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3.2.2 Accuracy
Figure 7. Vocabulary is a significant predictor of accuracy in the
Ashby perceptual category learning task for the hypothesis-testing
block, but not for the associative block.
Ashby perceptual category learn-
ing task. To investigate how the in-
dividual difference measures related
to task performance, I constructed a
mixed-effects model with random in-
tercepts for subject. Adding the fixed
effect of system significantly improved
model fit, χ2(1) = 138.15, p <0.0001.
In the next step, I added RAM, vocab-
ulary, and the three executive function
tasks as fixed effects. This further im-
proved fit, χ2(5) = 12.24, p = 0.03.
Next, I added the interactions between the individual difference measures (vocabulary, flanker, switcher,
and Tower of London) and system one by one. The only interaction that significantly improved fit was the
between vocabulary and system, χ2(1) = 4.82, p = 0.03. Thus, the final model included random intercepts
for subject, fixed main effects for system, RAM, vocabulary and all three executive function tasks, and the
fixed interaction effect between vocabulary and system. This model revealed a significant interaction be-
tween vocabulary and system, F (1,131) = 4.83, p = 0.03 (see Fig 7). The model also revealed significant
main effects of system and vocabulary.
To break down the interaction, I ran separate follow-up linear models for each of the systems. Vocabulary
remained a significant predictor in the hypothesis-testing model, F (1,126) = 7.36, p = 0.004. The coefficient
associated with vocabulary in this model was positive (b = 0.29, SE = 0.10). However, vocabulary was
not a significant predictor in the associative model, F (1,127) = 1.16, p = 0.28. Thus, participants with
higher vocabularies showed higher accuracy in the hypothesis-testing block, but accuracy was not related
to vocabulary in the associative block.
Sloutsky statistical density task. To investigate how the individual difference measures related to task
performance, I constructed a mixed-effects model with random intercepts for subject. Adding the fixed effect
of system marginally improved model fit, χ2(1) = 3.38, p = 0.07. In the next step, I added RAM, vocabulary,
and the three executive function tasks as fixed effects. This step significantly improved fit, χ2(5) = 17.27,
p = 0.004. In the next steps, I added each of the interactions between individual difference measures and
system one by one. None of the interactions improved fit. Thus, the final model predicted accuracy in this
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task from system and the individual difference measures, but not their interactions. This model revealed
a significant main effect of flanker, F (1,126) = 4.34, p = 0.04, and a significant main effect of switcher,
F (1,126) = 8.87, p = 0.003 (see Fig 8).
Figure 8. Flanker performance has a positive re-
lationship with Sloutsky accuracy, while switcher
performance has a negative one. Sloutsky ac-
curacy is collapsed across blocks.
The coefficient associated with flanker was positive (b
= 0.14, SE = 0.07), while the coefficient associated with
switcher was negative, (b = -0.20, SE = 0.07). There was
also a marginally significant effect of system, F (1,131) =
3.40, p = 0.07. Thus, accuracy on the Sloutsky statistical
density task was positively related to a stronger flanker
effect (i.e., poorer inhibitory control) and negatively re-
lated to switcher performance. However, these results
should be interpreted with caution, as large ceiling ef-
fects were found in accuracy for this task.
Taxonomic/thematic task. Again I constructed a
mixed-effects model with random intercepts for subject.
Adding the fixed effect of system significantly improved
model fit, χ2(1) = 5.13, p = 0.002. Adding the individual
difference measures also significantly improved fit, χ2(5)
= 12.31, p = 0.03. None of the interactions significantly
improved fit. Thus, the final model predicted accuracy in
this task from system and the individual difference mea-
sures, but not their interactions. This model revealed a
significant main effect of system, F (1,131) = 5.20, p = 0.02, and a significant main effect of Tower of London,
F (1,126) = 6.56, p = 0.01 (see Fig 9). The coefficient associated with Tower of London was positive (b =
0.20, SE = 0.08). Thus, accuracy on the taxonomic/thematic task was positively related to performance on
Tower of London.
Summary. This section showed that different individual difference measures were related to accuracy
in the three category learning tasks. In the Ashby perceptual category learning task, there was a specific
positive effect of vocabulary on performance in the hypothesis-testing block. For the Sloutsky statistical den-
sity task, accuracy was positively related to the size of the flanker effect and negatively related to switcher
performance. Tower of London accuracy was positively related to accuracy in the taxonomic/thematic task.
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3.2.3 Reaction time
Figure 9. Tower of London accuracy is positively re-
lated to accuracy in the taxonomic/thematic task. Tax-
onomic/thematic accuracy is collapsed across blocks.
Ashby perceptual category learning task. To in-
vestigate how the individual difference measures
were related to reaction time, I constructed a mixed-
effects model with random intercepts for subject.
Adding the fixed effect of system significantly im-
proved model fit, χ2(1) = 33.97, p <0.0001. In the
next step, I added fixed effects of all of the individ-
ual difference measures and RAM. This further im-
proved fit, χ2(5) = 12.18, p = 0.03. Next, I added the
interactions one by one. The only interaction that
significantly improved fit was the between vocabu-
lary and system, χ2(1) = 11.19, p = 0.0008. Thus,
the final model included random intercepts for sub-
ject, fixed main effects for system, RAM, vocabulary and all three executive function tasks, and the fixed
interaction effect between vocabulary and system. This model revealed a significant interaction between
vocabulary and system, F (1,130) = 11.49, p = 0.0009 (see Fig 10). The model also revealed significant
main effects of system and vocabulary and a marginal main effect of Tower of London.
Figure 10. Vocabulary is a significant predictor of reaction time in the
Ashby perceptual category learning task for the associative block, but
not for the hypothesis-testing block.
To break down the interac-
tion, I ran separate follow-up
linear models for each of the
systems. For reaction time,
vocabulary was not a signifi-
cant predictor in the hypothesis-
testing model, F (1,125) = 1.49,
p = 0.23. However, vocabulary
was a significant predictor in the
associative model, F (1,125) =
10.41, p = 0.002. The coeffi-
cient associated with vocabulary
in this model was positive (b =
0.40, SE = 0.12). Thus, participants with higher vocabularies showed slower reaction times in the associa-
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tive block, but reaction time was not related to vocabulary in the hypothesis-testing block.
Figure 11. Tower of London accuracy is a significant predictor
of reaction time in the Sloutsky statistical density task for the
associative block, but not for the hypothesis-testing block.
Sloutsky statistical density task.
Once again I constructed a mixed-
effects model with random intercepts
for subject. Adding the fixed effect of
system significantly improved model fit,
χ2(1) = 52.75, p <0.001. Adding the in-
dividual difference measures as fixed ef-
fects also significantly improved fit, χ2(5)
= 12.35, p = 0.03. The only interac-
tion that significantly improved fit was
between system and Tower of London,
χ2(1) = 10.17, p = 0.001. Thus, the final
model had the fixed effects of system and the individual difference measures as well as the interaction be-
tween system and Tower of London. This model showed a significant interaction between Tower of London
and system, F (1,130) = 10.41, p = 0.002, as well as significant main effects of system and Tower of London
(see Fig. 11).
To unpack this interaction, I ran two follow-up linear models predicting reaction time from RAM, vocabu-
lary, and the three executive function tasks, one for each system. The hypothesis-testing model showed no
main effect of Tower of London, F (1,126) = 0.22, p = 0.64. In contrast, the associative model did show a sig-
nificant main effect of Tower of London, F (1,126) = 10.67, p = 0.001. The coefficient associated with Tower
of London in this model was positive (b = 0.28, SE = 0.09), suggesting that reaction time was positively
related to Tower of London performance specifically for the associative system in this task.
Taxonomic/thematic task. I constructed a mixed-effects model with random intercepts for subject.
Adding the fixed effect of system significantly improved model fit, χ2(1) = 18.79, p <0.001. However, adding
the individual difference measures did not further improve fit, χ2(4) = 0.75, p = 0.98. Further, adding the
interaction between flanker and system significantly improved fit, χ2(1) = 5.71, p = 0.02. None of the other
interactions significantly improved fit. Thus, the final model included random intercepts for subject, main
effects for system, RAM, and all the individual difference measures, and an interaction between flanker and
system. This model revealed a significant interaction between system and flanker, F (1,130) = 5.75, p =
0.01 (see Fig 12).
To further break down this model, I ran two follow-up linear models for each of the systems. The model
for the hypothesis-testing block showed a significant main effect of flanker, F (1,126) = 4.38, p = 0.04. The
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coefficient was negative (b = -0.15, SE = 0.07), suggesting that individuals with a stronger flanker effect
were also faster to respond in the hypothesis-testing block. However, flanker was not a significant predictor
in the associative block, F (1,126) = 0.30, p = 0.59.
Figure 12. The flanker effect is a significant predictor of reaction
time in the taxonomic/thematic task for the hypothesis-testing block,
but not for the associative block.
Summary. Similar to what was
seen in accuracy above, this set of
analyses showed that different indi-
vidual difference measures were re-
lated to speed during the three dif-
ferent category learning tasks. Par-
ticipants with smaller vocabularies
responded faster in the associative
block of the Ashby task. However,
participants with higher accuracy on
the Tower of London responded more
slowly during the associative block of
the Sloutsky task. Finally, participants
with a smaller flanker effect responded slower on the hypothesis-testing block of the taxonomic-thematic
task.
3.2.4 Exploratory analyses
While this section is largely devoted to testing the relationship between category learning and individual dif-
ferences in vocabulary and executive function, two additional individual difference measures were collected
(CELF RS and FS). Next I will report the results of analyses investigating the relationship between category
learning and these measures.
Ashby perceptual category learning task. For both accuracy and reaction time, the base model was
a mixed-effects model with random intercepts for subject and fixed effects of system and RAM. Adding the
two CELF measures did not significantly improve fit for accuracy, χ2(2) = 4.24, p = 0.12, but they did improve
fit for reaction time, χ2(2) = 7.70, p = 0.021. The reaction time model revealed a significant main effect of
FS , F (1,124) = 7.67, p = 0.006 with a positive coefficient (b = 0.20, SE = 0.07). Thus, participants with
better expressive grammar were slower on the Ashby task.
Sloutsky statistical density task. For both accuracy and reaction time, the base model was a mixed-
effects model with random intercepts for subject and fixed effects of system and RAM. Adding the two CELF
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measures did not significantly improve fit for accuracy, χ2(2) = 2.81, p = 0.25, or reaction time, χ2(2) = 0.51,
p = 0.78. Thus, CELF FS and RS did not predict accuracy or reaction time in this task.
Taxonomic/thematic task. The base model for both accuracy and reaction time had random intercepts
for subject and fixed effects for system and RAM. CELF FS and RS did not significantly improve model fit
for accuracy, χ2(2) = 0.14, p = 0.93, or reaction time, χ2(2) = 2.15, p = 0.34.
Summary. These analyses largely show that receptive and expressive grammar were not related to
performance in the three category learning tasks in this study. The only significant effect was of FS on
reaction time in the Ashby perceptual category learning task. The general lack of results may be influenced
by the fact that the participants in this study were at the upper age limit for the CELF (18-21 years) and
that they represent a typical (non-language-impaired) population. Thus, this measure may not have been
sensitive to fine-grained individual differences in receptive and expressive grammar in this population.
3.3 Discussion I: individual differences
In this section, I tested the core hypothesis of this dissertation, which was that categorization in the
hypothesis-testing system relies on executive function while categorization in the associative system re-
lies on verbal labels. I used three category learning tasks and three executive function tasks in addition
to measuring vocabulary, which I used as a measure of labeling ability. I expected to find that executive
function was strongly related to categorization across tasks in hypothesis-testing blocks but not associa-
tive blocks. Conversely, I expected to see strong relationships between associative block performance and
vocabulary, but no relationship between hypothesis-testing block performance and vocabulary.
These hypotheses were not supported by the data. While certain individual difference measures were
specifically related to performance in only one system (associative or hypothesis-testing) in each task,
the relevant individual difference measures varied by category learning task. In addition, I did not see
the hypothesized relationships between vocabulary and the associative system, nor did I see a positive
relationship between performance and executive function in most analyses. Since each category learning
task differed, I will discuss them separately.
3.3.1 Ashby perceptual category learning task
In this task, I saw an interaction between vocabulary and performance in both accuracy and reaction time.
Participants with larger vocabularies showed higher accuracy in the hypothesis-testing block and slower
reaction times in the associative block. While this is the opposite of what I predicted, it is broadly consistent
with COVIS if we assume that vocabulary size is broadly related to verbal ability, rather than a specific
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measure of labeling. Rule-based (hypothesis-testing) categories as described by COVIS must have a ver-
balizable rule for inclusion; as such, this system is supposed to rely heavily on verbal resources. A study
by Perry & Lupyan (2014) found that upregulating activity over Wernicke’s area lead to increased use of
bi-dimensional categorization strategies. This study used perceptual stimuli (sine wave gratings) that could
be categorized either with a uni-dimensional rule, a conjunctive bi-dimensional rule, or an integrative bi-
dimensional rule. While the authors report more use of bi-dimensional strategies, they do not indicate
which type of bi-dimensional strategy was being used. Given the relationship between language and rule-
based category learning in COVIS, this study likely supports the idea that increased recruitment of language
resources is related to better bi-dimensional rule-based (rather than integrative) categorization. Thus, the
paper by Perry & Lupyan (2014) is consistent with our results showing that stronger language skills (here,
vocabulary) are related to better rule-based categorization ability.
A similar relationship between language resources and performance was seen for the associative sys-
tem in this task. Information-integration categories, which are best learned by the associative system,
should have no verbal rule for inclusion. Thus, recruiting verbal resources when learning an information-
integration category could slow down processing, perhaps by engaging the suboptimal hypothesis-testing
system. Indeed, one study showed that when a verbal rule is accessible, the hypothesis-testing system
takes over even when it is suboptimal for learning (Noseworthy & Goode, 2011). Thus, participants with
higher vocabularies may recruit verbal hypothesis testing resources in associative blocks which slows down
processing.
The lack of significant executive function effects in the Ashby perceptual category task specific to the
hypothesis-testing system is not particularly surprising, given the mixed literature on the topic. Some studies
do find specific relationships between aspects of executive function and categorization in the hypothesis-
testing system in this type of task. Minda & Rabi (2015) tested some participants on rule-based (hypothesis-
testing) and information-integration (associative) categories after they completed a task taxing executive
function, while other participants completed an easy task before category learning. They found that the
participants with depleted executive function resources showed difficulty learning rule-based categories
but not information-integration categories. In addition, DeCaro et al. (2008) found that working memory
capacity was positively related to category learning in the hypothesis-testing system but negatively related
to category learning in the associative system. However, another study found working memory capacity to
be similarly related to both associative and hypothesis-testing category learning (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Inhibitory control has also been shown to be associated with optimal strategy use for both the associative
and hypothesis-testing systems in older adults (Maddox et al., 2010). Thus, the fact that the current study
does not find a specific relationship between use of the hypothesis-testing system and executive functioning
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is in line with the mixed nature of previous literature. However, the fact that no main effects of executive
function were found in the Ashby perceptual category learning task is unexpected, as all of the studies cited
above did find some relationship between category learning and executive function measures.
In summary, performance on the Ashby perceptual category learning task was most related to individual
differences in vocabulary. Individuals with larger vocabularies showed better performance in the hypothesis-
testing system and poorer performance in the associative system. This result is in line with prior research
using the COVIS approach, which shows that verbal resources benefit hypothesis-testing but not associative
learning of perceptual categories. In addition, this study adds to the mixed literature on the role of executive
function in perceptual category learning by providing a null result.
3.3.2 Sloutsky statistical density task
The Sloutsky statistical density task showed main effects of inhibition and task-switching on accuracy, and
a specific effect of planning on reaction time in the associative block. I will discuss these results; however,
caution must be taken in interpreting the accuracy results, as there were considerable ceiling effects in this
task.
Better inhibition was related to higher accuracy, while poorer task switching was related to better accu-
racy. The main effect of inhibition on accuracy is somewhat different from a prior study showing a significant
interaction between category sparsity and flanker performance, such that individuals with better inhibition
skills also showed faster responses in a picture-word verification task specifically for sparse items (Perry &
Lupyan, 2016). However, this study used multiple versions of the flanker task where the distractor arrows
either appeared simultaneously with the target arrow, 150ms before the target arrow, or 500ms before. This
allowed the authors to measure both the cost of incongruent distractors as well as the advantage of con-
gruent distractors. The congruent advantage typically does not appear when the target and distractors are
presented simultaneously, as they were in the current study (Botella et al., 2002). It was this congruent
advantage, and not the incongruent cost, that the authors found to be specifically related to sparse catego-
rization. Thus, the current study may have been limited by its choice of flanker task; perhaps the interaction
between system and inhibition would have been found with a congruent advantage effect rather than the
classic flanker effect.
The paper by Perry & Lupyan (2016) also looked at how interfering with language resources affected
performance on the picture-word verification task. They found that sparse categories were specifically
affected by cathodal stimulation over Wernicke’s area. That is, interfering with language resources led to
slower and less accurate recognition of items from sparse categories, but had no effect on dense categories.
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Given these results, we might expect that individual differences in vocabulary or language measures like the
CELF would be related to performance during hypothesis-testing blocks in the Sloutsky statistical density
task. However, none of those effects were found for this task. Instead, the significant predictors were related
to executive function.
All three executive function measures showed some relation to performance in this task. The flanker
and switcher effects on accuracy are hard to interpret, given the considerable ceiling effects in this task.
However, the specific effect of planning in the associative block is puzzling; it is expected that individuals
with better planning skills would be faster at the category learning task, not slower. Additionally, I originally
hypothesized that any effects specific to executive function would be found in the hypothesis-testing system,
not the associative system. Thus, this interaction was the reverse of my predictions both in direction (bet-
ter planning = slower) and system (associative rather than hypothesis-testing). In terms of direction, one
explanation is that that individuals who exhibited better planning took more time and care in completing as-
sessments, while those with poorer planning completed tasks quickly overall. In the hypothesis-testing block
of this task, participants were told which feature to focus on. It is possible that this type of learning does
not involve planning; participants could select the feature quickly regardless of their planning ability and
overall task speed. In the associative block, there was more of a chance for participants to examine stimuli
at different speeds, as no features were highlighted during learning. Thus, the more deliberate participants
may have responded slower in this block and performed better during the Tower of London task. Thus,
these effects may not reflect strong connections between the constructs of planning and category learning
and may instead reflect an overall approach towards the experimental tasks and behavioral measures.
Overall, the results from the Sloutsky statistical density task are hard to interpret. The effects of flanker
and switcher on accuracy suffer from ceiling effects, and the effect of planning on reaction time seems
to be more related to overall speed of processing than planning specifically. Previously found relation-
ships between individual difference measures and performance on categories of different sparsity were not
replicated in this study. This likely stems from significant issues in task and stimulus design that are not
addressed in some of the original Sloutsky papers. These issues will be discussed more below.
3.3.3 Taxonomic/thematic task
Finally, I saw two effects of executive function on performance in the taxonomic/thematic task. First, there
was a main effect of planning on accuracy, such that individuals with higher Tower of London accuracy
were also more accurate on the taxonomic/thematic task as a whole. Second, there was a specific effect of
inhibition on reaction time in this task. Participants who were better at inhibiting irrelevant information in the
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flanker task were also slower at responding in the thematic (hypothesis-testing) block.
There is some literature suggesting that inhibitory control is specifically related to thematic processing.
For example, one study found that activation in the angular gyrus is common to both processes (G. A. Lewis
et al., 2018). However, another study found increased power in the upper alpha band for taxonomic but not
thematic processing (Maguire et al., 2010). The authors of this study interpreted these results to indicate
increased inhibitory control during taxonomic processing. However, changes in the upper alpha band have
also been linked to creativity interventions (Fink et al., 2011), decision-making (Fink et al., 2018), reflection
(Rominger et al., 2017), and attention (Van der Lubbe et al., 2019). Thus, changes in alpha power during
taxonomic but not thematic processing may indicate many processes. Finally, another study found that
cognitive control was related to the strength of semantic relations rather than whether they were taxonomic
or thematic (Geller et al., 2019). Thus, the findings from the current study contribute to a mixed literature.
One explanation for these findings is that participants with strong inhibitory control may be over-inhibiting
taxonomic information that may actually be beneficial for the thematic task. As discussed above, taxonomic
and thematic relations can be a mix of both (e.g., horses and cows are both animals and things found on
a farm). Thus, these results may indicate that the thematic relations used in our task may be weaker than
those used in our taxonomic task. Regardless, it appears as though some executive function measures
play a role in taxonomic and thematic processing.
Some previous studies have found other relations between executive function (specifically, cognitive
flexibility) and taxonomic/thematic processing. In a few tasks, this was assessed by first reinforcing either
taxonomic or thematic relations and then switching to the other type of relation. Studies show that younger
school-age children are better at maintaining and switching to a thematic relation than a taxonomic relation,
while older adults (ages 60-90) show a specific difficulty in switching to taxonomic relations but no difficulty in
maintaining them (Blaye et al., 2007; Maintenant et al., 2011). This could suggest that taxonomic relations
rely on executive function, such that individuals with poorer executive function (young children and older
adults) have more difficulty switching to them. However, these studies do not directly measure individual
differences in task switching, so this interpretation is purely speculation. Indeed, it is not borne out by the
current results, as no relationships between task switching and performance on the taxonomic/thematic
task were found.
The lack of a relationship between vocabulary or grammar and the taxonomic/thematic task is somewhat
unexpected. One study found that production of relational terms at 24 months was related to a thematic
preference at 3 years of age (Dunham & Dunham, 1995). Another study found that vocabulary was related
to the strength of priming between thematically-related items but not for taxonomically-related items in
school-aged children (Brooks et al., 2014). These studies suggest that vocabulary is somewhat related to
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thematic categorization in childhood. However, it is possible that this relationship disappears by adulthood,
when semantic processing and vocabulary skills are more fully developed. This would explain the lack of
effects seen in the current study.
The most interesting finding in this analysis was the specific effect of inhibitory control on reaction
time in the thematic task. This finding adds to the mixed literature on the effect of executive functions on
taxonomic/thematic processing. In addition, no effects were found for vocabulary or grammar, suggesting
that these language resources do not modulate performance in taxonomic/thematic processing. Given the
relatively abstract nature of this type of semantic processing and the role language plays in thought, this
finding is surprising.
3.3.4 Limitations and conclusions
While this study was designed with many considerations in mind, it is certainly not without its flaws. One
limitation of this study was the choice to use vocabulary as a measure of labeling. I chose this measure
instead of a paired-associate learning task because I was interested in elaborated links between meanings
and labels rather than just memory for labels. However, adding a paired-associate learning task in addition
to the vocabulary measure could have provided a deeper understanding of the relationship between label-
ing and category learning in the two systems. Additionally, the grammar measure (CELF) showed limited
variability in this sample. Grammar and syntax are certainly important for word form and meaning learning
during development, so it is possible that the limited variability contributed to the mostly null findings regard-
ing this measure and category learning. A measure of working memory capacity would also have served
to broaden the study’s examination of category learning and executive function. Finally, as described in Ex-
periment 1, the Sloutsky statistical density task would have benefited from careful examination and norming
of stimuli.
Another more general limitation of this study is its use of cognitive experimental tasks to conduct an
individual differences analysis. This issue is described and tested in Hedge et al. (2018). The general
idea is that many experimental tasks are designed to minimize individual differences to produce a robust
group or condition effect. Reliable tasks that are sensitive to individual differences are often discarded, as
the experimental effect of interest is obscured by the individual differences and thus considered not robust.
The paper cited above found low intraclass correlations between different testing instances in the same
subjects for many commonly used experimental tasks. For example, they found ICCs as low as 0.40 for
the flanker task, a task used in the current study. Since many of the findings from the current study are
relatively novel and conducted on a single sample, replication is needed before strong conclusions can be
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made. Finally, multivariate approaches that can include all the individual difference measures as well as all
the category learning tasks in a single model would provide additional insight into the relationships among
these measures.
Despite these limitations, this study takes a step towards understanding individual differences in cat-
egory learning. A striking pattern revealed in this analysis is that different individual difference measures
were related to performance on the three category learning tasks. Even those measures that showed rela-
tionships to more than one category learning task (e.g., planning) had different relationships with each task.
Thus, not only was the core hypothesis not supported from this investigation, but the comparability of these
three paradigms for studying category learning is not apparent. In other words, this analysis suggests that
different skills underlie each of the three category learning tasks. To further address this issue, the next
analysis will directly compare performance on the three category learning tasks without taking into account
individual difference measures.
3.4 Results II: cross-paradigm comparison
For descriptive statistics on subject- and block-wise aggregated accuracy and reaction time in the category
learning tasks, see Tables 14 and 15.
Table 14
Descriptive statistics for category learning tasks (subsample) – accuracy.
Paradigm Associative Hypothesis-testingMean SD Range Mean SD Range
Ashby perceptual 0.58 0.07 0.46-0.76 0.81 0.14 0.45-0.97
Sloutsky statistical density 0.95 0.09 0.6-1.00 0.92 0.15 0.2-1.0
Taxonomic/thematic 0.84 0.13 0.21-1.00 0.84 0.16 0.21-1.00
Note. Only the 84 subjects included in the cross-paradigm analyses are summarized in this table.
Table 15
Descriptive statistics for category learning tasks (subsample) – reaction time.
Paradigm Associative Hypothesis-testingMean SD Range Mean SD Range
Ashby perceptual 738 250 122-1780 621 134 131-1030
Sloutsky statistical density 792 206 431-1320 667 151 413-1210
Taxonomic/thematic 1730 752 786-6030 1920 545 918-3500
Note. Only the 84 subjects included in the cross-paradigm analyses are summarized in this table.
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3.4.1 Data processing
Concordant with an a priori power analysis and pre-registration, only the first 84 undergraduate students
with complete data were included in the analyses reported in this section. Recall that the relationships
between task conditions and the two categorization systems are summarized in Table 12.
Ashby perceptual category learning task. Accuracy and reaction time were measured for this task.
Accuracy was summarized by subject and system. For reaction time, only accurate trials were used. Out-
liers were removed on a by-trial basis using the same method described in the individual differences analy-
sis. Then, reaction time was summarized by subject and system. Next, I constructed boxplots to summarize
mean RTs for each system and paradigm. Subjects who were clear outliers for both systems within a given
paradigm were excluded (1 participant) and replaced with the next participant. Accuracy and reaction time
were then Yeo-Johnson transformed to reduce skewness, as well as centered and scaled. At this point, any
subjects with a z-score of less than -3 or greater than 3 were considered outliers and removed from further
analysis.
Sloutsky statistical density task. Any participants who did not respond correctly to at least 6 of the
8 catch trials for a given block were removed from future analyses. Thus, all subjects reported in analyses
using this task had at least 75% accuracy on catch trials in both blocks. Accuracy was summarized by
subject and system. Reaction time outliers were removed on a by-trial basis as described above and
reaction time was then summarized by subject and system. Next, I constructed boxplots to summarize
mean RTs for each system and paradigm. No subjects for this task were clear outliers. Accuracy and
reaction time were then transformed, centered, and scaled. At this point, any subjects with a z-score of less
than -3 or greater than 3 were considered outliers and removed from further analysis.
Taxonomic/thematic task. Practice trials were discarded before analysis. Accuracy was summarized
by subject and system. Reaction time outliers were removed using the same method as above, and then
reaction time was summarized by subject and system. Next, I constructed boxplots to summarize mean RTs
for each system and paradigm. Subjects who were clear outliers for both systems within a given paradigm
were excluded (2 participants) and replaced with the next 2 participants. Accuracy and reaction time were
then transformed, centered, and scaled. At this point, any subjects with a z-score of less than -3 or greater
than 3 were considered outliers and removed from further analysis.
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Table 16
Correlations between category learning tasks – accuracy.
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. HT Ashby perceptual -
2. HT Sloutsky statistical density 0.21 -
3. HT Taxonomic/thematic -0.07 0.18 -
4. AS Ashby perceptual 0.37* 0.12 0.00 -
5. AS Sloutsky statistical density 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.14 -
6. AS Taxonomic/thematic 0.05 0.14 0.39* -0.12 0.23 -
Note. Only the 84 subjects included in the cross-paradigm analyses are included in this table. HT = hypothesis-testing,
AS = associative. * p <0.05, Bonferroni corrected.
Table 17
Correlations between category learning tasks – reaction time.
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. HT Ashby perceptual -
2. HT Sloutsky statistical density 0.30 -
3. HT Taxonomic/thematic 0.24 0.36* -
4. AS Ashby perceptual 0.58* 0.25 0.24 -
5. AS Sloutsky statistical density 0.29 0.49* 0.26 0.31 -
6. AS Taxonomic/thematic 0.13 0.22 0.54* 0.19 0.23 -
Note. Only the 84 subjects included in the cross-paradigm analyses are included in this table. HT = hypothesis-testing,
AS = associative. * p <0.05, Bonferroni corrected.
3.4.2 Accuracy
To investigate whether accuracy was comparable across paradigms, I constructed a mixed-effects model
with random intercepts for subject. Adding the fixed effects of paradigm and system significantly improved
model fit, χ2(3) = 32.24, p <0.0001. Adding the interaction between paradigm and system further increased
fit, χ2(2) = 75.60, p <0.0001. Thus, the final model predicted the accuracy z-scores from paradigm, system,
and their interaction. This model revealed a significant main effect of system, F (1,415) = 38.37, p <0.0001,
as well as a significant interaction between paradigm and system, F (2,415) = 41.00, p <0.0001 (see Fig
13). To further investigate this interaction, I conducted three follow-up models, each testing the effect of
system within a given paradigm.
The first model revealed a significant main effect of system in the perceptual category learning paradigm,
F (1,83) = 210.27, p <0.0001. A follow-up t-test confirmed that accuracy was significantly higher for the
hypothesis-testing system, t(133) = -11.90, p <0.0001. The second model revealed no main effect of
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system in the statistical density paradigm, F (1,83) = 0.92, p = 0.34. A follow-up t-test confirmed this result,
t(135) = 0.91, p = 0.36. Finally, the third model showed no main effect of system in the taxonomic-thematic
paradigm, F (1,83) = 0.73, p = 0.40. This was confirmed by a follow-up t-test, t(164) = -0.66, p = 0.51.
Figure 13. Accuracy results for cross-paradigm comparison analysis. Points indicate means with error bars
reflecting standard error. Shaded portions represent the distribution of accuracy z-scores.
Overall these results suggest that these three paradigms are not comparable. While no differences be-
tween systems were found for the statistical density and taxonomic-thematic tasks, the perceptual category
learning task showed a different pattern. However, the statistical density task may have been suffering from
ceiling effects. Of the 84 total subjects, average accuracy values were 0.9 or higher during the statistical
density paradigm in 76 subjects for the associative block and 58 subjects for the hypothesis-testing block.
Thus, the statistical density task may not be sufficiently difficult to detect differences between systems in
accuracy.
3.4.3 Reaction time
To investigate whether reaction time was comparable across paradigms, I constructed a mixed-effects
model with random intercepts for subject. Adding the fixed effects of paradigm and system significantly
improved model fit, χ2(3) = 13.48, p = 0.003. Adding the interaction between paradigm and system fur-
ther increased fit, χ2(2) = 44.65, p <0.0001. Thus, the final model predicted the accuracy z-scores from
paradigm, system as well as their interaction. This model revealed a significant main effect of system,
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F (1,415) = 14.62, p = 0.0001, but no main effect of paradigm, F (2,415) = 0.017, p = 0.84. The interaction
between system and paradigm was also significant, F (2,415) = 23.30, p <0.0001 (see Fig 14). To further
investigate this interaction, I conducted three follow-up models each testing the effect of system within a
given paradigm.
The first model revealed a significant main effect of system in the perceptual category learning paradigm,
F (1,83) = 29.96, p <0.0001. A follow-up t-test confirmed that reaction time was significantly faster for the
hypothesis-testing system, t(141) = 3.73, p = 0.0002. The second model revealed a significant main effect
of system in the statistical density paradigm, F (1,83) = 44.00, p <0.0001. A follow-up t-test showed that
again reaction time was faster for the hypothesis-testing system, t(165) = 4.62, p <0.0001. Finally, the
third model also showed a main effect of system in the taxonomic-thematic paradigm, F (1,83) = 14.96, p =
0.0002. However, for this paradigm the pattern was flipped. Reaction times were faster for the associative
system, t(162) = -2.68, p = 0.008.
Figure 14. Reaction time results for cross-paradigm comparison analysis. Points indicate means with error
bars reflecting standard error. Shaded portions represent the distribution of reaction time z-scores.
3.5 Discussion II: Cross-paradigm comparison
This analysis aimed to directly compare three dual-systems approaches to category learning. From a the-
oretical standpoint, considerable similarities can be drawn between these approaches. They each consider
two category structure types, which can be mapped onto similarity- and rule-based categories. In addition,
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two of the approaches posit very similar systems for learning these categories, each specifically adapted to
a single category type. The associative system best learns similarity-based categories by integrating and
compressing multiple features using an iterative and associative process. The hypothesis-testing system
uses higher-order skills like working memory and executive functions to select and test hypotheses about
category-relevant features. This system is best for learning rule-based categories. Each approach uses
a different paradigm to measure how individuals learn these different category structures. I hypothesized
that while there are considerable task-related differences among the paradigms from each approach, each
paradigm would engage the relevant category learning system in a given block. Thus, I expected to see
a main effect of system but no effect of paradigm, indicating that each task separately engaged the two
systems in different blocks.
I did not find these hypothesized results in either accuracy or reaction time. In accuracy, two of the
paradigms showed no differences between systems while one showed a different pattern. For the Ashby
perceptual category learning task, accuracy was much lower for the associative system than for the hypothesis-
testing system. In fact, mean accuracy in the associative block of this task was barely above chance, indicat-
ing that participants may not have even learned these categories. In contrast, no accuracy differences were
seen between the two blocks in the taxonomic/thematic and Sloutsky statistical density task. The Sloutsky
statistical density paradigm also suffered from considerable ceiling effects. In reaction time, I again saw
paradigm-related differences. In both the Ashby perceptual category learning task and the Sloutsky statisti-
cal density task, participants were significantly faster in the hypothesis-testing block than in the associative
block. However, this pattern was reversed for the taxonomic/thematic task. In the next section, I will discuss
some of the task-specific factors that may have contributed to the differences in performance seen across
the three tasks.
3.5.1 Task differences
Stimuli. One of the most striking differences between Ashby, Sloutsky, and taxonomic/thematic tasks is the
stimuli. Almost all papers following the COVIS model use sine-wave grating/Gabor patch stimuli, where the
only varying features are orientation and frequency. This type of stimulus is largely meaningless, although
some papers attempt to map it onto more meaningful categories like alien eyes, minerals, or flowers (Perry &
Lupyan, 2014; Tolins & Colunga, 2015). However, in most studies it is difficult to connect a sine-wave grating
stimulus to existing category knowledge. Previous research has shown that even minimal prior knowledge
can facilitate category learning, (Kaplan & Murphy, 2000). In addition, providing information about individual
features (even without explicitly linking them to categories) helps participants attend to category-relevant
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features in subsequent category learning (Kim & Rehder, 2011). Thus, meaningless categories like the
sine-wave gratings should be harder to learn than the novel stimuli in the Sloutsky statistical density task,
which were based on existing categories (e.g., flowers).
This assumption is supported both by prior research and the current results. In one COVIS-based study,
participants only achieved a mean accuracy of 79% for information-integration (associative) stimuli, 93%
for simple rule-based (hypothesis-testing) stimuli, and 82.1% for complex rule-based (hypothesis-testing)
stimuli (He´lie et al., 2010). In contrast, similarity-based stimuli from Kloos & Sloutsky (2008) were learned
with almost perfect accuracy after viewing just 16 instances, and rule-based stimuli were learned to about
75% accuracy (taking into account false alarm responses) after a single encounter with the category rules.
In the current study, accuracy was lower in the Ashby perceptual category learning task than in the other
two tasks overall. This perhaps suggests that perceptual categories are learned in a different manner or
on a different time scale than categories that are connected to meaning, like those used in the Sloutsky
statistical density and taxonomic/thematic tasks.
An interesting thing to note is that dense (associative) stimuli used in the Sloutsky statistical density
task would be considered rule-based under COVIS. Recall that the two core features of rule-based stimuli
under COVIS are that the rules for inclusion are easily verbalizable and that the learner can make a decision
on each feature separately before their combination. This is certainly the case for the dense (associative)
statistical density stimuli used in the current study (e.g., aliens with small bodies and big feet and curly hair
and few teeth, etc.). None of the dimensions need to be integrated before making a category decision; the
conjunctions linking them (“and”) do that work instead. Thus, from a COVIS perspective, all of the stimuli
used in the current Sloutsky statistical density task are rule-based, albeit with varying numbers of relevant
dimensions. This may explain the large discrepancy between accuracy in the associative blocks for the
Ashby and Sloutsky tasks – the former was close to chance while the latter was nearer to ceiling. Rule-
based (hypothesis-testing) stimuli from the COVIS approach are consistently easier to learn; participants
show higher accuracy for these stimuli than for information-integration (associative) stimuli in most if not all
studies. Thus, perhaps all of the stimuli in the current Sloutsky statistical density are in fact tapping the
hypothesis-testing system, leading to no differences in accuracy between the two blocks.
Finally, the stimuli used in the taxonomic/thematic task are in some ways fundamentally different than
those used in the other tasks. Participants in this study took more than twice as long on average to respond
to taxonomic/thematic stimuli than to Ashby perceptual or Sloutsky statistical density stimuli. They also
are the only stimuli that include real-world objects; the other tasks used stimuli constructed specifically
for the experiment. Another core difference is that taxonomic and thematic categories can be somewhat
overlapping. For example, horses and sheep are both animals (taxonomic) but they also are commonly
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found together in a farming scenario (thematic). Thus, it is possible that individuals use both the hypothesis-
testing and the associative systems to process taxonomic and thematic categories. This is in direct contrast
to perceptual categories, which by design can only be learned with a certain type of strategy, and statistical
density categories, which have a clear ideal system depending on their density.
Task Demands. In creating this study, I chose to use common paradigms from each approach. I se-
lected this strategy because I wanted to see if each approach as it currently stands was engaging the two
category learning systems in the same way. However, this lead to some core differences in task struc-
ture, the most important of which being the learning procedure. In the Ashby perceptual learning task,
participants had no training period. They were told from the beginning that they would be learning novel
categories, initially starting with trial and error. Each trial of this task was a test trial, and each trial included
feedback. In contrast, each block of the Sloutsky statistical density task had a training period where cat-
egory information was presented to the participant, and a testing period where no feedback was present.
The taxonomic/thematic task was somewhere in between. It had both training and testing with feedback
present for both. Thus, learning demands differed for all three tasks.
Prior research has compared different types of learning tasks for perceptual categories (Ashby et al.,
2002). In this study, some participants learned hypothesis-testing and associative categories in the same
feedback-based paradigm used in the current study. Other participants saw exemplars from a given cat-
egory and were told which category these exemplars belonged to, similar to the way participants learned
associative categories in our Sloutsky statistical density task. They found that participants could learn
hypothesis-testing categories in both learning conditions. However, participants showed difficulty learning
the associative categories in the exemplar-based training. Another study found feedback learning to be
superior to exemplar-based learning for both types of categories (Edmunds et al., 2015). In our study,
participants were nearly at ceiling for learning associative categories using exemplar-based training in the
Sloutsky statistical density task. This suggests that even if learning demands were equated across tasks,
performance would still not be equivalent for the different types of stimuli.
3.5.2 Limitations and conclusions
As discussed above, one of the limitations to this study is that it used different types of tasks in each
paradigm. That makes it hard to disentangle whether the paradigm-related differences seen in this study
are due to dissimilarities between the theories each paradigm is trying to test or simple task differences.
Future studies would benefit from greater control of task demands. Additionally, the concerns about stim-
ulus norming discussed in Experiment 1 also apply to this experiment, as the stimuli used in the Sloutsky
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statistical density task for both experiments were the same. More careful examination of feature salience
and relations among features would make it easier to compare these stimuli to sine-wave gratings and
taxonomic/thematic categories.
A key takeaway from this study is that despite the theoretical similarities behind these approaches,
the tasks they use to measure category learning are not directly comparable. Even after accounting for
scaling considerations by using z-scores, the relationship between category learning in the two systems is
not consistent across paradigms. As discussed above, this could simply be explained by task and stimuli
differences; perhaps each approach is indeed trying to measure the same types of processing, but they are
taxing the systems differently. Another possibility is that each approach is fundamentally trying to explain
different, albeit related, phenomena. I will consider the second possibility in the general discussion.
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4 General Discussion
The goal of this dissertation was to closely examine the role of language in a dual-systems model of cate-
gory learning. In this section I will review the findings of the current study and use them to reconsider my
hypotheses and the overarching dual-systems framework for category learning.
4.1 Language in a dual-systems model: summary of results
This study had two experiments designed to test the ways in which language is related to category learn-
ing. It combined different standardized cognitive and language measures with experimental measures of
executive function and category learning in an attempt to broadly characterize the relations among these
different constructs. Below, I will summarize the most important results from each experiment and analysis.
4.1.1 Language and the interaction between two systems
In Experiment 1, I tested whether the order in which an individual engages different category learning sys-
tems affects learning in those systems. I also tested whether any observed order effects vary according
to general language ability. I predicted that switching from the hypothesis-testing system to the associative
system would produce a cost, while switching from associative to hypothesis-testing would not. This predic-
tion was based on prior research showing dominance of the hypothesis-testing system when both systems
could be engaged (Ashby & Crossley, 2010; Erickson, 2008). I also predicted that switch costs would be
higher in individuals with poorer language ability, since my prior research has shown that low-language
individuals exhibit difficulty in switching away from suboptimal learning strategies (Ryherd & Landi, 2019).
Neither of these hypotheses were supported by the data. Instead of poorer performance in second
blocks, which would indicate a switch cost, all order effects were driven by better performance in second
blocks, a result more consistent with a learning effect. In addition, there was no interaction between lan-
guage ability and order in any of the three analyses. Thus, the observed learning effect did not depend on
an individual’s language ability.
4.1.2 Individual differences and dual-systems category learning
In the first analysis of Experiment 2, I investigated whether individual differences in vocabulary and executive
function would predict performance on three category learning tasks. I expected to see that vocabulary,
acting as a measure of labeling ability, would be related to performance on associative category learning
62
blocks, while executive function would be related to performance on hypothesis-testing blocks. I expected
these relationships to hold across all three category learning tasks.
The results did not support these hypotheses. First, performance in each category learning task was
related to different individual difference measures. Vocabulary showed significant effects in the Ashby
category learning task, planning affected performance in the Sloutsky statistical density task, and inhibitory
control affected taxonomic/thematic task performance. Further, when a single measure was related to two
category learning tasks (e.g., planning in the Sloutsky and taxonomic/thematic tasks), the direction of the
relationship was different.
In addition, most of the relationships I found did not match the overall predictions. I expected to see
a positive relationship between vocabulary and associative learning and no relationship for hypothesis-
testing learning. Instead, vocabulary seemed to facilitate hypothesis-testing learning and impair associative
learning in the Ashby perceptual category task. Further, higher planning skill was specifically related to
poorer performance in the associative block of the Sloutsky task. The only predicted relationship was in the
taxonomic/thematic task, where inhibition (an executive function measure) was related to performance in the
hypothesis-testing but not the associative block. However, the direction of this relationship was unexpected;
individuals with stronger inhibitory control were slower in the hypothesis-testing block.
4.1.3 Cross-paradigm comparison
The second analysis in Experiment 2 was the first to directly compare performance across three differ-
ent paradigms designed to test dual-systems approaches to category learning. These approaches have
considerable theoretical similarities (see Chapter 1); as such, it is conceivable that the experimental tasks
used to test these approaches measure the same type of processing. I tested subjects on the three tasks
and hypothesized that the pattern of performance would be similar across all three. That is, if participants
showed higher accuracy on the associative block than the hypothesis-testing block of one task, this pattern
should hold for the other two tasks.
This hypothesis was not supported by the results. In accuracy, participants showed significant differ-
ences between the associative and hypothesis-testing blocks for the Ashby perceptual category learning
task, but no block differences for the Sloutsky statistical density task or the taxonomic/thematic task. In
reaction time, the Ashby and Sloutsky tasks showed similar patterns, while the taxonomic/thematic task
was the reverse. Together, the results suggest that these three tasks as they are typically administered
are not comparable and do not engage the same processing. This is supported by the lack of significant
correlations among the different category learning tasks.
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4.2 Rethinking the dual-systems model of categorization
In the introduction to this document, I drew parallels across six different approaches to category learning.
Each approach split category learning and categorization in two. Some categories were probabilistic, with
fuzzy boundaries for inclusion. Others were based on clearly-defined rules. Many of these approaches
proposed a dual-systems model for learning these two types of categories, positing a different system
specifically tuned for each category type’s structure. I combined these different approaches to suggest
a more unified dual-systems theory of category learning. However, the experiments described above do
not support this combined theory. Rather than showing similarities across the different approaches, these
experiments revealed different patterns of performance for each task as well as different relationships with
individual difference measures. Thus, the theoretical similarities seen across these approaches are not
apparent in the data. This casts doubt on a single unified dual-systems theory of category learning. Indeed,
this investigation is not the first to question dual-systems models.
4.2.1 Existing critiques of dual-systems models
COVIS is the main dual-systems model some researchers have argued against, which is likely due to
its prominence and popularity. While many studies have shown dissociations between the two category
learning systems proposed in COVIS, some more recent studies have made strong claims against the
existing evidence. For example, one paper points out that common stimuli used in a COVIS paradigm are
not sufficiently matched. Thus, the double dissociations seen in these paradigms may be due to stimulus
characteristics rather than differential processing. For example, one study tested the effect of feedback
using stimuli that were matched on participant error rates, category separation, and relevant dimensions
(Edmunds et al., 2015). This study did not find a difference between category type, a finding in opposition
to previous studies with less carefully-matched stimuli (Ashby et al., 2002; Maddox et al., 2003).
Another critique of the COVIS framework is its assumption that items learned by the associative system
are learned nonverbally and implicitly. To test this assumption, another study tested recognition mem-
ory for exemplars of rule-based (hypothesis-testing) and information-integration (associative) stimuli after
the categories were learned (Edmunds et al., 2016). Recognition memory is commonly assumed to test
explicit memory (Gabrieli et al., 1995). If participants could reliably recognize exemplars from information-
integration categories, the authors reasoned that it would be unlikely that these items were being learned
truly implicitly. In fact, Edmunds et al. (2016) found that participants not only were able to recognize
information-integration (associative) stimuli at an above-chance rate, they were also more accurate at rec-
ognizing information-integration (associative) stimuli than rule-based (hypothesis-testing) stimuli. This sug-
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gests that instances that should have been learned using the associative system implicitly were at least
available to explicit memory after learning. Further support for this critique comes from a study showing
that participants produced verbal reports of their learning strategies that matched model-based strategy de-
termination (Edmunds et al., 2015). Thus, participants were able to access both the items they had learned
as well as the method they had learned for categorization, even when using what should have been the
implicit system.
A third critique of COVIS centers on mathematical models that are used to verify whether an individual
is using associative or hypothesis-testing strategies to learn categories. Decision-bound strategy analy-
sis fits different decision boundary models to the category responses made by participants, which helps
researchers determine their learning strategies (Maddox & Ashby, 1993). However, a recent study used
simulations to test the validity of this type of analysis (Edmunds et al., 2018). The authors created simu-
lated participants who used either associative or hypothesis-testing strategies, and then ran decision-bound
strategy analysis on the simulated data. They found that over a third of simulated participants using a
hypothesis-testing strategy were misidentified, while almost all simulated participants using an associative
strategies were also misidentified. This suggests that decision-bound strategy analysis, which is commonly
used as a manipulation check in COVIS studies, may not be valid for determining participants’ category
learning strategies.
The existing critiques of COVIS serve as an initial jumping-off point for reconsidering dual-systems
models of category learning. While the introduction to this document highlighted the considerable theoretical
overlap among multiple frameworks, it did not examine the assumptions each framework makes about
the process of category learning. Careful consideration and empirical investigation of these assumptions
may serve to help us better understand how to fit these approaches together by elucidating the specific
phenomena and processes each approach attempts to explain. One more obvious aspect that has been
largely overlooked in this study so far is the way in which depth of processing interacts with category
structure.
4.2.2 A multidimensional space
In this section, I will argue that carving categories and category learning into discrete chunks is an oversim-
plification, both in terms of category structure and the systems used to learn them. Instead, I will suggest
that category learning should be considered in terms of two continuous measures. First, I suggest that cat-
egory structure is continuous, ranging from highly rule-based categories to strongly similarity-based ones
with blended categories in between. Next, I highlight how depth of processing should be considered when
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conducting investigations of category learning.
One of the key insights from the Sloustky statistical density approach is that category structure lies on
a spectrum. By using the formulas described in Sloutsky (2010), researchers can construct stimuli that
are highly dense, highly sparse, or somewhere in between. Other researchers have pointed out similar in-
between categories. Lupyan (2013) conducted a series of experiments showing that seemingly rule-based
categories like grandmothers or even numbers exhibit typicality effects usually associated with probabilistic,
similarity-based categories. This suggests a spectrum of category structure, where the presence or even
relative importance of category rules interacts with category typicality and other hallmarks of similarity-
based categories. Categories at either end are the ones described by most dual-systems approaches:
rule-based vs. similarity-based; low-dimensional vs. high-dimensional; dense vs. sparse, etc. However,
these models are not yet equipped to deal with categories whose structure lies in the middle of the spectrum.
Thus, we see that a dual-systems model with two systems each set up to learn a different type of cat-
egory structure begins to fall apart. How would the hypothesis-testing and associative systems deal with
one of these blended categories? The verbal/nonverbal approach suggests that the two systems would
run in parallel, and the system with the quickest answer or the strongest evidence would make the final
category decision (Minda & Miles, 2010). In fact, overlapping brain regions have been found to support
both associative and hypothesis-testing category learning, suggesting common or at least parallel process-
ing (Carpenter et al., 2016). However, more research investigating the skills underlying categorization of
blended-type categories is needed before strong claims can be made.
Another way to characterize the experiments conducted above is in terms of depth of processing. Some
neurobiological research has shown that visual processing of objects takes place in occipital regions, while
processing the semantic features of objects occurs in temporal pole and parahippocampal regions (Man
et al., 2018). This suggests that stimuli that are primarily visual with little to no meaning (like sine-wave
gratings) would be processed differently than taxonomically or thematically related items, which strongly
recruit semantic resources. In addition, new research shows that when retrieving the meaning of a word,
we access both perceptual and conceptual information on a similar time frame (Borghesani et al., 2019).
This suggests that semantic information is available at the same time as perceptual information. Thus,
categorization involving relations among items (e.g., taxonomic and thematic judgments) may involve the
integration of more information sources than perceptual category learning in a similar time frame. Again,
this suggests that the type of processing done in an Ashby perceptual category learning task may be
qualitatively different that taxonomic/thematic processing. However, this possibility cannot be disentangled
from potential task-related effects in the current study.
Clearly, more research is needed to separate the effects of category structure, depth of processing,
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and task demands on category learning and its related cognitive processes. The current study takes a
first step towards this goal by laying the theoretical groundwork and conducting preliminary experimental
investigations, both of which produced the insights to guide future research. By considering both category
structure and depth of processing in a continuous manner, the next steps in this line of research will help us
to better understand the relationships that exist among the many different approaches to category learning.
4.3 Conclusions and directions for future research
For this document, I started with a fairly simple premise: there are lots of approaches to category learning,
and they all can be mapped on to a single framework. I identified a dual-systems model for category learning
that drew elements from six different approaches and proposed hypotheses about how language might play
a role in each system. Then, I conducted two experiments and three analyses to test these hypotheses
and the broader framework. Despite considerable theoretical overlap, I found differences in each category
learning task. Participants showed different patterns of performance for the two category learning systems
in each approach. Different measures were related to each approach, and even when a single measure
was common across multiple approaches, the direction of the relationship varied. Together, these results
suggest that the simple framework proposed in my introduction is not a sufficient unifying theory for category
learning.
This investigation strongly highlighted the complexity involved in understanding category learning. There
is a reason that reviews of COVIS explicitly constrain the domain of their explanation (perceptual categories)
at the outset. It is possible that no single theory can explain category learning at all levels of processing.
However, the move from a discrete view of category systems and structure to something more continu-
ous can only benefit future investigations. By adopting a continuous understanding of category structure,
researchers may find additional metrics to describe their categories of interest. In addition, this investi-
gation should highlight the importance of thoroughly considering the assumptions used in any theoretical
approach to category learning. For example, many of the claims made by Sloutsky and the statistical den-
sity approach rely on a empirical investigations involving a mathematically-determined measure of category
density. However, category density is calculated using a constant for attentional weighting that is assumed
to be the same for all features. Without careful testing of this assumption, we cannot truly determine the cat-
egory density, which makes interpretation of statistical density tasks more difficult. Thus, this study revealed
the need for more inquiry into the specific parameters involved in each task.
This study was also proposed with the intention of it being a first step towards understanding category
learning in development. While a few of the approaches discussed in Chapter 1 do consider the devel-
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opmental course of category learning, they typically use an adults versus children group comparison that
gives relatively little information on the developmental trajectory of category learning. I hope that the syn-
thesis of category learning approaches discussed in this document eventually makes its way into a lifespan
perspective on category learning. Certainly, many of the complexities discussed above need to be ironed
out in a typically-developing adult sample before translating the current theoretical framework and empirical
methodology to different age groups. However, testing children on a broad spectrum of category structures,
for example, may provide insights into a dual-systems model that is not apparent in an adult sample. For
example, children may show differences between items at the end of the spectrum (very rule-based and
very similarity-based) where adults did not, due to reduced compensatory mechanisms or an undeveloped
hypothesis-testing system. Thus, the study of a dual-systems model of category learning would benefit
from more developmental work, even while keeping the above concerns in mind. This study ends with a
perhaps predictable and unsatisfying conclusion: category learning is complicated. Even when using ex-
perimental paradigms from previous research and reviewing considerable amounts of literature, a simple
unifying result did not emerge from the data. Most of my hypotheses ended up unsupported, even though
they were the result of a synthesis of six approaches to category learning. However, each analysis added
new knowledge about the processes supporting category learning. This dissertation was the first to look
at multiple category learning approaches and individual difference measures in an entirely within-subjects
design. It also provided new insight for future directions, such as carefully manipulating category structure
and depth of processing along continuous dimensions. Hopefully, these insights are a first step toward
better understanding category learning and the ways language interactions with and supports it.
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5 Appendix A: Statistical Density Calculations
5.1 Statistical density formulae
Statistical density is the method that Sloutsky and colleagues use to define categories (Sloutsky, 2010).
Dense categories have multiple intercorrelated features, while sparse categories have few relevant features.
Statistical density can vary between 0 and 1. Higher values (closer to 1) are dense, while lower values
(closer to 0) are sparse. We calculate statistical density (D) with the following formula, where Hwithin is the
entropy within the category and Hbetween is the entropy between the category and contrasting categories.
D = 1 –
Hwithin
Hbetween
To find total entropy (H), we sum entropy due to varying dimension and entropy due to varying relations
among dimensions.
H = Hdim + Hrel
This equation is the same whether you are calculating within-category entropy or between-category
entropy. To find entropy due to dimensions, you use the following formulas, where M is the total number of
varying dimensions, wi is the attentional weight of a particular dimension (assumed to be 1), and pj is the
probability of value j on dimension i.
Hdimwithin =
M∑
i=1
wi[
∑
j=0,1
within(pjlog2pj)]
Hdimbetween =
M∑
i=1
wi[
∑
j=0,1
between(pjlog2pj)]
To find entropy due to relations, you use a similar set of formulas, where O is the total number of possible
dyadic relations among the varying dimensions, wk is the attentional weight of a relation (assumed to be
0.5), and pmn is the probability of the co-occurrence of values m and n on dimension k.
Hrelwithin = –
O∑
k=1
wk[
∑
m=0,1
n=0,1
within(pmnlog2pmn)]
Hrelbetween = –
O∑
k=1
wk[
∑
m=0,1
n=0,1
between(pmnlog2pmn)]
All categories have 7 dimensions. For dense categories, 6 of these dimensions are correlated. The
seventh dimensions is allowed to vary randomly. For sparse categories, 6 of the dimensions vary randomly.
The seventh dimension is category-relevant and defines the category. All dimensions have two levels (e.g.,
for hair shape in aliens – curly and straight).
5.2 Statistical density calculations – sparse
First, we calculate the entropy due to dimensions. We have 7 dimensions, so M = 7. Between categories
(i.e., across all categories), each level of each dimension has a 0.5 probability of being present.
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Hdimbetween = –7 ∗ 1(2 ∗ 0.5log20.5)
Hdimbetween = –7log20.5
Hdimbetween = 7
Within categories, the relevant dimension does not vary – thus it does not contribute to the entropy. Its
value goes to zero, leading to the following calculations.
Hdimwithin = –6 ∗ 1(2 ∗ 0.5log20.5)
Hdimwithin = –6log20.5
Hdimwithin = 6
To find the entropy due to relations, we start by calculating O.
O =
M!
(M – 2)! ∗ 2!
O = 21
Between categories, all dyadic relations have the same probability of co-occurrence (0.25). For each
relation between dimensions, there are 4 possible combinations of the levels of those dimensions. They’re
all equally probable. Recall that for relations, we use an attentional weight of 0.5. So, we end up with the
following.
Hrelbetween = –21 ∗ 0.5(4 ∗ 0.25log20.25)
Hrelbetween = –10.5log20.25
Hrelbetween = 21
Within the target category, 15 of the dyadic relationships don’t include the relevant feature. Thus, their
probability of co-occurrence is .25. For 6 of the dyadic relations (any including the relevant feature), there is
perfect co-occurrence: probability is either 0 or 1. This makes these terms go to zero, because log21 = 0,
and anything multiplied by zero is zero.
Hrelwithin = –15 ∗ 0.5(4 ∗ 0.25log20.25)
Hrelwithin = –7.5log20.25
Hrelwithin = 15
Now, we use these calculated values to find entropy between and within categories.
Hwithin = 6 + 15
Hwithin = 21
Hbetween = 7 + 21
Hbetween = 28
Finally, we use the within- and between-category entropy to calculate the density.
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D = 1 –
21
28
D = 0.25
5.3 Statistical density calculations – dense
The between category entropy for dense categories is the same as for sparse categories. Hbetween = 28
Next, we will consider within-category entropy due to dimensions. Six of the seven dimensions do not
vary, so they do not contribute to the entropy. Their value goes to zero.
Hdimwithin = –1 ∗ 1(2 ∗ 0.5log20.5)
Hdimwithin = –log20.5
Hdimwithin = 1
Entropy due to relations is similar. Within the target category, 6 of the dyadic relationships don’t include
the relevant feature. Thus, their probability of co-occurrence is .25. For 15 of the dyadic relations, there is
perfect co-occurrence, so their values go to zero.
Hrelbetween = –6 ∗ 0.5(4 ∗ 0.25log20.25)
Hrelbetween = –3log20.25
Hrelbetween = 6
Next, we calculate the within-category entropy.
Hwithin = 1 + 6
Hwithin = 7
Finally, we use the within- and between-category entropy to calculate the density.
D = 1 –
7
28
D = 0.75
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6 Appendix B: Task Stimuli
This appendix contains information about the stimuli used in two of the category learning tasks.
6.1 Sloutsky statistical density task
The Sloutsky statistical density task had 4 blocks, 2 with dense stimuli and 2 with sparse stimuli.
6.1.1 Sparse stimuli
Figure 15. Example stimuli for supervised-sparse blocks. Bugs varied on body color, tail size, wing length,
number of fingers, finger length, dot number, and antennae shape.
Figure 16. Example stimuli for unsupervised-sparse blocks. Flags varied on shape, color, stripe direction,
number of stars, overlay shape, overlay position, and overlay size.
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6.1.2 Dense stimuli
Figure 17. Example stimuli for unsupervised-dense blocks. Aliens varied on body size, arm length, foot
size, number of teeth, smiling/frowning, hair shape, and number of eyes.
Figure 18. Example stimuli for supervised-dense blocks. Flowers varied on petal shape, petal color, stem
length, number of leaves, center size, center color, and number of bugs.
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6.2 Taxonomic/thematic task
In the taxonomic/thematic task, participants saw a target item had to choose either a taxonomically- or
thematically-related item. There were unrelated distractors as well as distractors with the opposite relation.
6.2.1 Taxonomic version
Table 18
Stimuli for the taxonomic version.
Target Taxonomic answer Thematic distractor Unrelated distractor
Kettle Coffee maker Stove Doorknob
Bird Turtle Tree Guitar
Lock Handcuffs Key Grapes
Sock Pants Shoe Cake
Toaster Microwave Bread Trumpet
Car Train Stop sign Yarn
Airplane Canoe Neck pillow Duck
Anchor Weight Life jacket Antelope
Bat Racket Ball Dresser
Binoculars Microscope Puffin Bell
Blackboard Easel Ruler Food processor
Cheese Ice cream Cheese grater Chessboard
Chipmunk Cat Peanut Mixer
Cigarette Pipe Cigarette cutter Tissue box
Corkscrew Peeler Wine Peanut
Cup Mug Juice Ironing board
Eggs Croissant Pan Ribbon
Fork Spoon Plate Purse
Headband Scrunchie Hairbrush Golf ball
Horn Clarinet Music stand Chips
Knife Sword Cutting board Camel
Lamp Candle Table Mailbox
Mop Duster Bucket Calculator
Motorcycle Car Helmet Umbrella
Necklace Ring Jewelry box Salt shaker
Paintbrush Pen Easel Rooster
Printer Shredder Desk Wheelchair
Soda Juice Chips Seashell
String Yarn Sewing machine Watch
Suitcase Basket Suit Snow globe
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6.2.2 Thematic version
Table 19
Stimuli for the thematic version.
Target Thematic answer Taxonomic distractor Unrelated distractor
Kettle Stove Coffee maker Doorknob
Bird Tree Turtle Guitar
Lock Key Handcuffs Grapes
Sock Shoe Pants Cake
Toaster Bread Microwave Trumpet
Car Stop sign Train Yarn
Strainer Pasta Peeler Receipt
Axe Log Shovel Thimble
Ladder Lightbulb Stool Tire
Dog Leash Cat Hair dryer
Exercise bench Dumbbell Exercise bike Goggles
Cooler Diet coke Fridge Camera
Corkscrew Cork Bottle opener Globe
Gun Bullet Starfish Sword
Money Cash Register Coin Lunchbox
Parrot Bird Cage Butterfly Skates
Candle Lighter Lantern Clock
Suit Hanger Skirt Scissors
High chair Cup Stroller Button
Backpack Binder Purse Balloon
Vacuum Rug Duster Fish hook
Laundry basket Shirt Basket Slinky
Wine glass Wine bottle Shot glass Mirror
File cabinet File Dresser Light switch
Steak Grill Ham Remote
Doll Dollhouse Army man Kayak
Roller blades Helmet Skateboard Lawnmower
Record player Speakers Radio Lipstick
Teeth Toothbrush Hair Flashlight
Pie Stove Croissant Crib
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